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PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON: USING

HEALTHCARE

ECONOMICS TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
W. DAVID BALL
ABSTRACT

For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the
United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where providers are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes obtained.
The result has been a system that incentivizes resource consumption, not
health improvements. Healthcare economists and policymakers have reacted by proposing a number of policies designed to control costs without
sacrificing quality. One approach is to reimburse providers on the basis of
health outcomes obtained. Under a pay-for-performance strategy, providers are incentivized to deliver healthcare in ways that are both efficacious
and efficient. This means providers are no longer paid for simply doing a
given "something" but, rather, are paid for doing "something effective."
The criminal justice system is plagued by many of the same distorted
individual and organizational incentives seen in health care. In all but a
handful ofjurisdictions, states wholly subsidize commitments to prisonthe fee-for-service model of doing "something"-without tying any of
these subsidies to outcomes obtained in prison. This means prison is paid
for even if it is neither effective nor efficient. An outcome-oriented, payfor-performance framework borrowed from healthcare economics might,
if applied to criminal justice, improve its efficacy and efficiency.
This Article focuses on the similarities between health care and criminal justice, the ways in which an outcome orientation might provide a
useful framework for controlling criminal justice costs without sacrificing
public safety, and the suggestion that we begin considering sentencing
choices within that framework.

t Many thanks to participants at the Stanford Criminal Justice Roundtable, the "Rationing
Criminal Justice" Panel at the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the Southwest Criminal Law Workshop, and the Santa Clara scholarship series for their insightful comments. I wish to particularly thank
Rachel Barkow, Jack Chin, Sharon Dolovich, Donald Dripps, Deep Gulasekaram, Carissa Hessick,
Sam Kamin, Pam Karlan, Maximo Langer, Justin Marceau, Tracey Meares, Erin Murphy, Michelle
Oberman, Daniel Richman, David Sklansky, David Sloss, Avani Sood, Bob Weisberg, Jeff Wu, and
Frank Zimring. All errors remain mine, of course.
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This is what I gathered. That in that country if a man falls into ill
health, or catches any disorder, or fails bodily in any way before he is
seventy years old, he is tried before a jury of his countrymen, and if
convicted is held up to public scorn and sentenced more or less severely as the case may be. There are subdivisions of illnesses into
crimes and misdemeanours as with offences amongst ourselves ....
But if a man forges a cheque, or sets his house on fire, or robs with
violence from the person, or does any other such things as are criminal
in our own country, he is either taken to a hospital and most carefully
tended at the public expense, or if he is in good circumstances, he lets
it be known to all his friends that he is suffering from a severe fit of
immorality, just as we do when we are ill, and they come and visit him
with great solicitude, and inquire with interest how it all came about,
what symptoms first showed themselves, and so forth,-questions
which he will answer with perfect unreserve; for bad conduct, though
considered no less deplorable than illness with ourselves, and as unquestionably indicating something seriously wrong with the individual
who misbehaves, is nevertheless held to be the result of either pre-natal
or post-natal misfortune.
Samuel Butler, Erewhon
INTRODUCTION

Healthcare economists have written extensively about the perverse

incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement, where healthcare providers
are reimbursed for each medical service rendered.2 Fee-for-service rewards quantity, not quality-providers get paid for doing something, not
for doing something well. In fact, under fee-for-service, a hospital's ineffective treatment resulting in a patient rehospitalization could be a finan-

cial gain to the hospital despite being a bad outcome for the patient. The

I.
2.

SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON 49 (Xist Publ'g 2015) (1872).
See infra Part I.
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hospital could be paid for the additional treatments its own ineffectiveness
made necessary.
One proposed alternative to fee-for-service is performance-based reimbursement, where providers are reimbursed based on patient outcomes.
This Article employs Professor Michael Porter's formulation of pay-forperformance, value creation, where value is measured in terms of health
care outcomes per dollar spent. 3 Porter's formulation has the advantage of
combining efficacy and efficiency in a single measure. It measures both
whether something improves health and whether it does so using the fewest resources possible. Health is promoted without making it subservient
to cost control; value cannot be created simply by saving money if those
savings result in worse health outcomes. At the same time, parsimony is
embedded; ceteris paribus, treatments which use the fewest resources are
preferred. Under a value-based system, a hospital is paid for results, not
processes. For example, if a heart surgery were performed and the hospital
subsequently had to readmit the patient, it would pay the resulting expenses itself. If the hospital's doctor performed the surgery and the patient
were healed, it would break even or make a little money. But if it treated
the condition effectively through other, lower-cost means (including effective aftercare), it would keep the surplus itself.
Much of the existing economic analysis of criminal justice has focused on the economic incentives of criminals, not on the structural relationships and organizational incentives of "providers" in the criminal justice system (e.g., law enforcement, prosecutors, correctional facilities, and
probation and parole). Looking at the incentives of providers in the system
might help to explain why the cost and scope of criminal justice have exploded in a manner similar to the way healthcare costs have exploded under fee-for-service reimbursement regimes. As in fee-for-service, criminal
justice providers face few cost constraints on their menu of interventions.
The government subsidizes particular responses, such as prison, in the
name of public safety without demanding evidence that these responses
work. Just as a readmitted cardiac patient under fee-for-service imposes
no financial hardship on providers who failed to cure her, so too does a
recidivist impose no financial losses on the institutions that failed to reform him. On the contrary, prison budgets tend to get bigger as prison
populations increase, even when those increases are the result of ineffective (or non-existent) rehabilitation programs. Given these similarities,
perhaps it is time to consider replacing our existing subsidy-for-service
criminal justice approach with funding based on performance.
Such an approach would have several advantages: providing economic incentives for non-carceral (and non-criminal) alternatives, promoting the development of evidence-based practices that are less resourceintensive, and providing incentives to adopt the state-of-the-art in criminal
3.

See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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justice policies. At the very least, it would require agencies to justify their
existing practices on efficacy and efficiency grounds-a justification that,
in our era of mass incarceration, will likely be found wanting.
This Article is both a thought experiment about how criminal justice
might be funded and a potentially useful source of lessons for those interested in reforming the system. Defining health outcomes is an ongoing
process that has encountered political, organizational, and theoretical obstacles. Getting constituencies to agree on measures, getting organizations
to implement them, and even deciding what health means and which data
are best associated with it has been a long and difficult process-and yet
progress has been made.4 I do not, in any way, mean to suggest that building an outcome-based system of criminal justice centered around improving public safety will be any easier or quicker. But I also know that health
outcomes were once seen as impossibly and hopelessly vague, while now
they are utilized in funding health care. In this Article, I will not-and
could not-come up with precise, operational definitions of public safety
that will apply to all or even most situations. At the very least, imposing a
standard by fiat would fail to get the practitioner buy-in necessary to make
an outcome orientation work. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned
from the health care experience, and the framework has clear benefits.
This Article builds on work-including some of my own-about the
decentralized nature of criminal justice and the concomitant cost-passing
and externalities among criminal justice agencies.5 It suggests new ways
to harmonize social welfare with the welfare of individual organizations.
The main thrust of the argument is to actually give weight to the invocation
of criminal justice goals-in this case, public safety-by making sure that
what criminal justice agencies are doing achieves that goal in the most
resource-efficient way. This means that the least-expensive alternative that
gets the same public safety result should be adopted, or else those agencies
which decide to pursue other options will have to pay the difference in
cost. One can readily imagine some policy changes that might result. Some
problems might not be worth any criminal sanctions at all, as the riskneeds-responsiveness principle has taught us. 6 Mentally ill offenders get
worse, at great expense, in prisons and jails;7 under pay-for-performance
4.
See infra Part II, Section IV.A.
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
See D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & R.D. Hoge, Classificationfor Effective Rehabilitation:
Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 20 (1990) ("Higher levels of service are
reserved for higher risk cases ... . [L]ower risk cases do as well or better with minimal as opposed to
more intensive service."); see also Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding
the Risk Principle:How and Why CorrectionalInterventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, 2004, at 3, 3 ("[W]e see intensive treatments and supervision leading to
no effect or increased recidivism for low-risk offenders.").
7.
See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS
THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 9-11 (2010), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final jails_v hospital ssrudy.pdf (finding that mentally ill inmates
are more likely to stay longer, commit suicide, and be abused, while incurring greater costs).
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they might be removed from the criminal justice system entirely. Lengthy
criminal sentences might not be worth the cost (both human and financial)
in terms of what they add to public safety and could be shortened.
The approach taken in this Article differs from my prior work in the
way it treats incarceration. At the time of sentencing, prison is almost
always treated as an undifferentiated mass. I propose instead that prison
and other dispositions in a given system be individuated, where individual
institutions begin to specialize in various subpopulations with particular
risks and needs. This means that a system would no longer consider that
prison time and jail time are fungible, where sentencing is just an assignment to be "treated" generally. Instead, sentences would be tailored to individual needs, with individual treatment programs in individual institutions. This would move beyond the current conception of "tailoring" custodial sentences, which, at most, considers only how much time in a generic prison or jail an offender should get.9
There are a few assumptions that underlie this analysis. First, this Article does not assume that "nothing works" in rehabilitating criminals, a
phrase often attributed to Robert Martinson, albeit one he did not write,
and one which flies in the face of recent criminological research.o The
Article does not take a position on any particular rehabilitative program
but is, instead, concerned with how to improve the uptake of the most robust and promising approaches to offender treatment, whatever they may
be. Just as medical techniques continue to improve, so too will the treatment of offenders. A system that provides financial incentives for the development and dissemination of the most effective programs need not be
locked into a particular theory or method. Second, this Article assumes
that data is better than intuition about "what is right" or "what works," and
because people often make claims about what criminal justice is, what it
does, or how the justice-involved anticipate or react to it, I want to test
these claims with the best techniques we have, even if they are not infallible. Intuition is subject to implicit biases that are both harder to detect and
correct than those embedded in actuarial instruments-provided, of
course, that those instruments are open to public scrutiny (which is not
always the case). Given the overwhelmingly racialized nature of American
criminal justice, the greater potential transparency of actuarialism could
allow us to more easily diagnose problems and adjust policies.

8. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 249-50 (2005) (discussing tailoring
in terms of sentence length and matching offense and offender facts to the federal sentencing guidelines); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100-01 (2007) (discussing tailoring in
Booker and only referring to time sentenced).
10.
See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 48-50 (1974). For a discussion of Martinson's legacy and a rejoinder to the idea that
"nothing works" is still the criminological state of the art, see Francis T. Cullen et al., Nothing Works
Revisited: DeconstructingFarabee'sRethinking Rehabilitation, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 101, 10306, 110-11 (2009).
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the similarities between the healthcare and criminal justice systems, emphasizing how feefor-service reimbursement tends to promote overuse, not effective and efficient use. Part II briefly summarizes what value-based healthcare economics is, and how it promises to control costs in healthcare without sacrificing health outcomes. Part III sketches out the ways in which a focus
on value provides new possibilities for a law and economics analysis of
criminal justice systems, while building on the policy and analytical work
already being done. Part IV lays out possible new models for the funding
and administration of criminal justice, building on some of my own prior
work as well as that of others. Part V discusses some shortcomings of this
approach and attempts to address them.
I. A TALE

OF Two SYSTEMS

The model of medical care provision and reimbursement in the
United States after World War II is notable for its complexity, perverse
incentives, and uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or legally necessary about it. Universal healthcare was considered beginning with the New Deal, but efforts to adopt it failed due to
opposition from the American Medical Association (among other factors).11 Employer-provided health insurance filled the gap, gained traction
as the federal government froze private-sector wages (but not private-sector benefits, including health benefits), and became solidified with favorable tax treatment after the end of World War 11.12 The healthcare "system"
that resulted was far from systematic in terms of who pays and who is paid.
It is a complex amalgamation of government-run and private for-profit and
non-profit providers, paid for by private and public health insurance (the
latter starting with Medicaid and Medicare), with medical care provided
by a mix of independent doctors, practice groups, Healthcare Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).13
Different parts of the system have coordination problems across health
provider and insurance networks, specialists, emergency medicine, longterm care, and the like. There has always been a need for more data-and
more incentives to study that data-on what works. 14 Doctors are not necessarily expected to get feedback about what eventually happens to their

11.
David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-Origins
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82-83 (2006).
12.
Id. at 83-84.
13. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755.
14.
For a review of the subject, as well as an introduction to the Cochrane Collaboration, an
international clearinghouse for "what works" in medicine, see John N. Lavis et al., Working Within
and Beyond the Cochrane Collaboration to Make Systematic Reviews More Useful to Healthcare
Managersand Policy Makers, 1 HEALTHCARE POL'Y 21, 23-32 (2006).

2017]

PA Y-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON

457

patients because those problems are often passed on to other "downstream" institutions and doctors. 5
Fee-for-service reimbursement was, until recently, the dominant system for reimbursing healthcare providers.' 6 Fee-for-service pays providers
per procedure-whether a doctor's visit, MRI, blood test, or other procedure-as long as it follows generally established protocols. 17 The problem
with fee-for-service is that it incentivizes additional procedures and interventions.' Providers are paid for doing something whether or not it leads
to demonstrated improvements. Even as health is invoked, there is little
financial pressure to improve health since reimbursements are not made
on that basis. In other words, providers are not paid for doing something
that works, just for doing something at all-and, in fact, sometimes more
interventions result in worse outcomes. 19 It is hard to control costs under
this system: one critic described the "perverse incentives" in the U.S.
healthcare system as "producing what they are designed to deliver: cost
inflation, inefficiency, and inequity."20
Under the fee-for-service system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Consumers want health care but do not bear the full cost
of consuming it (even with co-payments). 2' Providers are paid per service,
giving them no financial incentives to do less or even to know what a procedure costs. Insurers cover the costs that result, but they have no real control over them. The result is that costs balloon. There is little investment
on the front end of prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another
(price or services offered), and the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by a population that views health as beyond the purview of dollars and cents. One of the enduring questions is which group-if any-is
really steering health policy. Is the ultimate decision maker the insurer,
who pays? The doctor, who treats? And who benefits? The patient, who is
healed? Society, who is made safe from communicable diseases?

15.

Michael E. Porter, A Strategyfor Health CareReform-Towarda Value-Based System, 361

NEW ENG. J. MED. 109, 110-11 (2009).
16.

John T. Preskitt, Health Care Reimbursement: Clemens to Clinton, 21 BAYLOR U. MED.

CTR. PROC. 40, 40-44 (2008).
17.
See Robert A. Berenson & Eugene C. Rich, US Approaches to Physician Payment: The
Deconstruction ofPrimary Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 613, 613 (2010).
18.
Hendrik Schmitz, Practice Budgets and the PatientMix of Physicians-TheEffect of a Remuneration System Reform on Health Care Utilization, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1240, 1240 (2013)
("[T]his literature mainly finds that doctors provide more services in fee-for-service systems . . . .").
19.
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Op-ed, Are Good Doctors Badfor Your Health?,N.Y. TIMES Nov. 21,
2015, at SR7. For the systemic effects of overprescribing antibiotics, see Sarah Childress, Dr. Arjun

Srinivasan: We've Reached "the End of Antibiotics, Period," PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/dr-arjun-srinivasan-weve-reached-the-end-of-antibioticsperiod.
20.
Alan Maynard, Health Reform: Reinventing the Wheel, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/12/health-reform-reinventing-the-wheel.
21.
For a suitably consumer-focused treatment of the problem, see Leslie Goldman, How Much

Is This Gonna Cost Me, Doc?, 0 MAG., July 2015, at 72, 72.
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It is well known that the U.S. health care system is exceptional (although not in a good way), and the country has recently made significant
changes under the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). 22 All along, however, attempts to change the system have been met with fierce resistance
by insiders who fear lost rents or lost discretion to treat patients as they
see fit.23 In many instances, the very idea that medical care could be subject to cost-effectiveness analysis by outsiders was rejected. Only doctors
knew what was medically necessary, and they had to be given complete
freedom to pursue what was best for the patient.24
The model of criminal justice provision and reimbursement in the
United States is also notable for its complexity, perverse incentives, and
uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or
legally necessary about it. States did not originally pay for prisons, and
there were no state prisons at the time of the founding.25 The economics
of prison provision used to be different: governments got (or at least
thought they would get) revenues from prison labor, and this meant that
control over carceral populations was an economic benefit, not a loss.
State-provided prisons became the norm under different economic circumstances and remained even when the value of prison labor vanished. The
criminal justice "system" that resulted was far from systematic in terms of
who pays for it and who controls access to it. It is a complex amalgamation
of government-run and private for-profit prisons, local jails, and treatment
facilities, paid for by state, local, and federal funds. Each part of the system
has effects on the workload and efficiency of other parts, but there is little
coordination among them (with the exception of the few states with uni26
fled corrections systems). If prisons do a good job rehabilitating, it means
less work for police. If police arrest marginal criminals, it places more
stress on courts and jails. The system as a whole passes costs from agency
to agency and fails, in many cases, to treat the offender in a consistent and
22.

See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.

119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 23-28 (1982) (discussing doctor resistance to change generally); id. at 252-54 (discussing doctor resistance within the
progressive era); id. at 271 (discussing doctor resistance during the New Deal); id. at 280 (discussing
the introduction of "socialized medicine"); see also Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It's the Institutions,
Stupid! Why Comprehensive NationalHealth InsuranceAlways Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH POL.

POL'Y & L. 329, 330-35 (1995) (identifying structural reasons in the U.S. political system as well as
resistance from medical professionals).
24.
STARR, supra note 23, at 26-28.
25.
This treatment largely reproduced that of a prior article. See W. David Ball, Why State Pris-

ons?, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 89 (2014) [hereinafter Ball, Why State Prisons?]. For a Californiaspecific treatment, see W. David Ball, "A False Idea ofEconomy": Costs, Counties, and the Origins

ofthe Calfornia CorrectionalSystem, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 26, 28-31 (2016)
[hereinafter Ball, A False Idea]. For a lengthier treatment on the origins of state prisons (one which
does not focus on political economy), see generally REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941

(2008).
26. . For background on unified corrections, see generally BARBARA KRAUTH, NAT'L INST. OF

CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE JAIL FUNCTION WITHIN STATE UNIFIED
CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS (1997), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/014024.pdf.

PA Y-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON

2017]1

459

coordinated manner. There is little data on what works, and few incentives
to study what data there is. 27 District Attorneys (DAs) and judges are under
no pressure to get feedback about what eventually happens to individual
criminals in their cases because those problems are passed on to other
downstream institutions and practitioners. Even as public safety is invoked, there is little financial pressure to improve public safety since reimbursements are not made on that basis (though perhaps actors face some
political pressure, an element of the equation discussed at length in the
literature).2 8
Under the prison subsidy system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Local taxpayers want public safety but do not bear the full
cost of consuming prison beds (even though they pay for police and, sometimes, local courts). DAs and judges are not required to consider the cost
of sentencing outcomes (except in states like Missouri) 29 and in no case
must they systematically consider whether the cost paid is either an efficient or efficacious use of resources. The value of prison is assumed to be
greater than zero, but its costs are not borne by the local officials whose
decisions drive prison admissions. More interventions or prison time does
not always improve criminal justice outcomes-they can make them
worse. 30 The state government covers the prison costs that result, but it has
little control over prison utilization (in part because the legislature continually expands the penal code, as William Stuntz has observed). 3 1 The result is that costs balloon. There is too little investment on the front end of
prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another (overcrowding or programming and treatment), but the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. 32 Again, one of the enduring questions is
which group-if any-is really steering criminal justice policy. Is the ultimate decision maker the legislature, who writes expansive penal codes?
The DA or judge, who charges and sentences? And who benefits? The
inmate, who is incarcerated? The public, who is made safe from crime?
The victim, who is vindicated?3 3

27.

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Samuel R. Wiseman, The CriminalJustice

Black Box, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
28.
For a skeptical view on the efficacy of prosecutorial elections, see Ronald F. Wright, How
ProsecutorElectionsFail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009).
29.
Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri's Experiment, 77 Mo. L. REV. 391,

391 (2012).
30.

Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, PrisonsDo Not Reduce Recidi-

vism: The High Cost ofIgnoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 50S-51 S (Supp. 2011).
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519
31.
(2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32.
33.
Not all crimes have victims in a tangible sense-who is the victim in a consensual drug sale
or in resisting arrest? Moreover, victims do not drive decisions-the prosecutor does. In some cases,
for example, prosecutors seek the death penalty over the objections of surviving family members. See,
e.g., Wayne A. Logan, DeclaringLife at the CrossroadsofDeath: Victims'Anti-Death Penalty Views
and Prosecutors'ChargingDecisions, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 43-45 (1999).
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It is well-known that the U.S. penal system is exceptional, and not in
a good way. As with medicine, attempts to change the system have been
met with fierce resistance by insiders who fear lost rents (e.g., prison
guards) or lost discretion to treat crime as they see fit. In many instances,
the very idea that criminal law could be subject to cost effectiveness analysis by outsiders is rejected. Only prosecutors know what is best for public
safety, and they need to be given complete freedom to pursue what is best
for society. DAs are, in many ways, the entire system, able to charge under
expansive penal codes and drive bargains; John Pfaff has made a convincing argument that changes in prosecutorial charging patterns helped drive
increases in incarceration from 1994 to 2008.34
To say that the criminal justice and healthcare systems are similar is
not to say that crime and disease are identical. Crime and disease share
some similarities, but also have important differences. But one need not
address crime when one is talking about incarceration; crime is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for incarceration.35 Crime goes unreported, unsolved, and unprosecuted. Poor health also goes undetected, undiagnosed,
36
and untreated. Crime is seen as much more a result of human agency than
is disease-choices about engaging in activities that are criminal as well
as choices about which activities will be deemed criminal-although some
lifestyle choices, such as smoking, increase risks of disease and some conditions, such as female hysteria in the 19th century, were the result of
which behaviors society deemed abnormal or worthy of treatment.3 7 Some
might say that crime is always bad and health is always good, but consider
whether using the criminal justice system as a form of social control is
universally acknowledged to be desirable, or whether extending the life of
a terminally ill patient through treatments with many unpleasant side effects is desirable.3 8

34.

See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.

1239, 1241 (2012); see also Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role ofDiscretion in the
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1998) (examining sentencing evidence in
California to conclude that prosecutors seek to maximize prosecution).
35.
See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive CaliforniaCounties'IncarcerationRates-and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987,
994, 1035-49 (2012) (noting reported crime rates in California counties explain only three percent of
the variance in new felon admissions).
36.
Nate Silver makes this point in his book. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY
So MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL-BUT SOME DON'T 217-19 (2012). Silver states that disease reports
tend to increase with news about the disease, citing one expert's opinion that the statistical signs that
swine flu was spreading rapidly "may have come from people reporting symptoms to their doctors
which they might otherwise have ignored." Id. at 219. In other words, knowledge about disease depends on perceptions of disease. In the next paragraph, Silver explicitly likens the situation to crime
reporting: if the police report an increased number of burglaries in a neighborhood, is that because
they are being more vigilant and are catching crimes that they had missed before, or have [they] made
it easier to report them? Or is it because the neighborhood is becoming more dangerous? Id.
37.
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in 19th-

Century America, 39 Soc. RES. 652, 652-55 (1972).
38.
To cite an example from the lives of economists (and the psychologists who influenced
them), Richard Thaler recounts that psychologist Amos Tversky decided not to seek cancer treatments
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Our understanding of disease is ultimately driven in part by what is
successful in treating it, and our ability to design successful treatments is
similarly affected by our understanding of disease. So perhaps the reason
medical analogy might seem strange is only because we are in the "four
humours" stage of our understanding. 39 We treat crime in a uniform fashion because we do not understand it, and we do not understand it because
we have not experimented with treating different crimes and criminals in
different ways.
II. THE VALUE CREATION MODEL

In healthcare, fee-for-service has been challenged by pay-for-performance, a term that describes a system in which providers are paid for improving health outcomes by whatever means the provider chooses.40 In
pay-for-performance, providers are no longer paid by the procedure, but
by the case, and they have freedom to treat cases according to their judgment, with two limits: they are budgetarily limited from doing too much,
and they are limited by malpractice from doing too little (or doing something harmful). Pay-for-performance is designed to improve efficiency,
and one recent study found that "financial incentives significantly influence physicians' supply of health care" and that value-based payments
"hold the promise of curbing costs without jeopardizing quality." 4 1 These
incentives are designed so that doctors will only order those interventions
that are, at the margin, necessary to treat the patient. Doctors should be
less inclined to order unnecessary interventions than under fee-for-service,
which reimburses the interventions even if they are not demonstrably tied
to the outcome.
Pay-for-performance is part of a lengthy project that is still very much
in progress, a project that seeks to improve the quality of doctors and their

at the end of his life: "[R]uining his final months with pointless treatments that would make him very
sick and at best extend his life by a few weeks was not a tempting option." RICHARD H. THALER,
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, at xiv (2015). Medicine more generally
has had to grapple with what "health" exactly means, as is seen in, e.g., the concept of quality-adjusted

life years (more life of lower-quality might be less desirable than a shorter life of higher quality).
Abraham Mehrez & Amiram Gafni, Quality-AdjustedLife Years, Utility Theory, and Healthy-Years
Equivalents, 9 MED. DECISION MAKING 142,142-43 (1989).
39.
GUIDO MAJNO, THE HEALING HAND: MAN AND WOUND IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 178

(1975).
Health care costs are also controlled by capitation systems whereby large organizations will
40.
be paid a certain per-person amount for a large population on the theory that the individual health
differences (and financial risks) of each member of the population will even out. See Meredith B.
Rosenthal, Beyond Payfor Performance-EmergingModels of Provider-PaymentReform, 359 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198-99 (2008). 1 do not address this model in this article but note this only to
complete the view of recent trends in healthcare economics.
Incentives Affect Medical
Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottleib, Do Physicians'Financial
41.
Treatment and Patient Health?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320, 1347 (2014). Contra Marina N. Bolotnikova, Are Hospital Pay-for-Performance Programs Failing?, HARV. MAG. (June 29, 2016),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2016/06/are-hospital-pay-for-performance-programs-failing.
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treatments. This project has taken a long time, in part, because both the
healthcare system and disease itself are complex, and measuring quality
and outcomes is difficult. Part of the explanation is also that it is very difficult to make major changes in the healthcare system without running into
intense opposition from doctors and other players in the system-a problem that would certainly also be true of attempts to change criminal justice
along the lines proposed. Pay-for-performance has built on earlier attempts
to standardize medical treatment, measure quality of care, and audit providers and institutions, 43 part of the professionalization of medicine so meticulously detailed in Paul Starr's The Social TransformationofAmerican
Medicine.44

Though quality improvements have been taking place at least since
the 1870s, 45 one early example of the more recent pay-for-performance
trend was the emergence of Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs).4 DRGs
classify patient conditions and tie them to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. If a patient needs a hip replaced, for example, his treatment is
billed according to that DRG, and the provider is paid a set amount to treat
the condition. DRGs give providers incentives in the average case to follow some form of the state of the art, on which the DRG payment is based,
while simultaneously offering incentives to adopt new techniques that are
as effective but cheaper in order to save the difference between the cost of
the procedure and the amount of reimbursement.
In a series of articles47 and a book,4 8 Michael Porter (and, occasionally, co-authors) refined the idea of pay-for-performance, identifying the
42.
For a recent history that focuses on the beginning of the quality movement in the 1980s
using a framework that, like this article, combines economics and "what works" and ultimately employs a "value-for-money competition," see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Man-

aged Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24, 25-28, 38-39 (Supp. 1 1993).
43.
Malpractice cases have already created some penalties for grossly substandard quality. The
focus of this article is on incentives to improve quality. The Eighth Amendment, like malpractice,
penalizes grossly substandard interventions, but it does not promote quality improvements beyond the
minimum. For the most influential early theoretical work on quality in healthcare, see Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166, 166-70

(1966).
44.
STARR, supra note 23, at 37-40. Pay-for-performance has also proceeded in parallel with
certain structural changes, such as the increased uptake of vertical integration in the provision of
healthcare (via HMOs and the like), which seeks to save money by focusing on prevention, coordinating care, and internalizing inter-departmental externalities. This Article focuses only on the concept
of pay-for-performance; an analysis of greater structural integration will be left to another article.
45.
Id. at 102-06 (discussing reforms to medical education and the re-imposition medical licensing).
46.
Robert B. Fetter et al., Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-RelatedGroups, 18 MED. CARE,

at i, 3 (Supp. 2 1980).
47.

See, e.g., Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in Health

Care, 89 HARV. Bus. REV. 46, 49-50, 58-61 (2011); Porter, supra note 15, at 109-10; Michael E.
Porter & Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health Care, 82 HARv. Bus. REV.

64, 66, 75-76 (2004); Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care,
91 HARV. Bus. REV. 50, 51-53 (2013); Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2477, 2477-78 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, What Is Value].
48.
MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 6-9 (2006).
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key problem in health care as a lack of value creation. He criticized some
pay-for-performance schemes as encouraging cost control without necessarily maintaining or improving health. For example, a provider reimbursed for a DRG procedure might cut corners, not just costs. Paying on
the basis of the state-of-the-art without measuring whether the intervention
worked does not incentivize effective healthcare. Porter argues that value
is created only when patients get healthier, when costs decrease, or both.49
One cannot focus only on outcomes or cost-one must focus on both. The
healthcare system can only evaluate outcomes by following the patient's
progress from beginning to end, even if she passes from one doctor in one
department to another doctor (or several others).
The value concept rejects a simple focus on cost cutting because if
cutting
comes at the expense of health outcomes, no value is added.51
cost
At its most radical, pay-for-performance calls for a restructuring of the
healthcare system; at the other end of the spectrum, pay-for-performance
simply encourages existing procedures to be done more effectively and
efficiently (including, sometimes, not at all). There is still considerable
autonomy within the system for doctors to pursue different treatments.52
The incentives built in to the system-the "pay" in pay-for-performancemean that evidence-based ideas, ones that can demonstrate real improvements in health outcomes, are favored. It also means that improvements
can be disseminated more rapidly because there is a financial disincentive
to continue ineffective or inefficient practices.
Pay-for-performance can be implemented in several ways, with a focus on particular treatments, on institutions, or on overall allocation of resources to maximize social welfare (by, e.g., focusing on prevention instead of treatment in the emergency room).5 3 One pay-for-performance

49.
Porter is not the only one to have latched on to this idea-the Jackson Hole Initiatives, for
example, also proposed accountability on health outcomes and cost-but I prefer his formulation because it combines efficacy and efficiency in a concise phrase. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood, Alain C.
Enthoven & Lynn Etheredge, The Jackson Hole Initiativesfor a Twenty-First Century American

Health Care System, I HEALTH ECON. 149, 149-50 (1992); see also Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G.
McGuire, Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 148-49
(1986) (concluding that a mixed lump sum and fee for service system would encourage better outcomes while controlling costs).
50.
Porter, supranote 15, at 110.
51.
The individual case is not always the sole focus of pay-for-performance-sometimes payfor-performance looks at the population level. Accountable Care Organizations, for example, are paid
bonuses if they are able to treat their patient populations at a lower cost than public medical programs
would have, presumably by promoting prevention over responsive treatment. Since this policy is more
aligned with prevention and restructuring of care rather than care improvements, I will not discuss it
in detail but for more see, for example, Alison Ritchie et al., Shifting Reimbursement Models: The
Risks and Rewards for Primary Care, MED. ECoN. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modemmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/aca/shifting-reimbursement-models-risks-and-rewards-primary-care.
52.
Indeed, one pair of doctors wrote to endorse the Affordable Care Act on the basis that it
might enhance physician autonomy. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Steven D. Pearson, Physician Autonomy

andHealth Care Reform, 307 [J]AMA 367, 367-68 (2012).
53.

For a general overview, see Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 1199.
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scheme that has recently been deployed by Medicare and Medicaid is hospital readmission penalties for certain procedures-the heart surgery example mentioned in the introduction. 54 Hospitals get reduced payments for
excessive readmissions following heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia.55 Excessive readmissions are defined as the risk-adjusted rate of readmission within thirty days relative to the national average. A hospital now
has an incentive to promote surgical aftercare, a patient-outcome-centered
approach that will lead to better results without incurring additional expensive hospital stays. These bonuses are a net gain to all parties: the patient is healthier and the cost savings can potentially be split between the
government and the provider. Another pay-for-performance scheme pays
for chronic conditions that cannot be cured, such as diabetes. 5 6 The outcomes evaluated in this instance include management of symptoms, quality of life, survival times, and cost of treatment.
Performance-based programs have to be adjusted; different types of
cases employ different incentives and metrics. The end goal in the cardiac
readmission example is a return to health; the end goal with chronic conditions like diabetes is maintaining quality of life (or slowing its decline).
The former has outcomes that are easier to quantify (readmission within a
certain time), the latter outcomes are much harder to quantify (quality of
life per unit of cost). This points out an operational problem with pay-forperformance. The goal of measuring and rewarding value for money can
be the same, but the means of getting there are often different.
While this vagueness is undoubtedly a weakness when viewed from
one perspective, it also, like many legal terms (e.g., "reasonable"), has the
advantage of being flexible enough to encompass a variety of situations.
Different definitions of health will have to be hashed out for different sets
of cases. Asking what outcome to measure in a given case assuredly involves decisions about the particular measurement, but, crucially, it does
not question the centrality of measuring and evaluating itself. The act of

54.
See supra Introduction. Hospital readmissions are a focus because they are both "prevalent
and costly" among Medicare patients. Stephen F. Jencks, Mark V. Williams & Eric A. Coleman, RehospitalizationsAmong Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEY ENG. J. MED.

1418, 1418 (2009).
55.
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CMS.GOv, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html
(last

modified Apr. 18, 2016, 5:08 PM).
56.
Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 55 (discussing "patients with complex chronic conditions
such as diabetes, or disabled elderly patients"). Note that there are often issues with comorbidity in
chronic conditions: patients often have more than one disease, and the treatment for someone suffering
from more than one condition is not always a matter of combining the individual treatments. The
regime can change entirely. For a study that evaluates long-term care for comorbid chronic conditions,
see Wayne J. Katon et al., Collaborative Carefor Patients with Depression and Chronic Illnesses,

363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2611, 2611-12 (2010).
57.
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute was established to fund studies on effective treatments and then to disseminate information and training based on those studies. PATIENTCENTERED
OUTCOMES
RESEARCH
INST.,
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
3
(2015),
http://www.pcori.org/sites/default/files/PCORI-Annual-Report-2015.pdf.
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negotiating what outcomes to measure and how to measure them cannot
be made once and set permanently for all cases because each case presents
different challenges. 58 Having the goal of improving outcomes per unit of
cost spent provides a criterion for improvement, some kind of yardstick,
even if the units of measurement on that yardstick (mortality, health, time
to recover, pain) might be different. Even if it were possible to set uniform
outcomes from on high for all cases, it would not be desirable because
those governed by pay-for-performance need to buy into the quality measurements selected or they will not effectively implement them.
Finally, an outcome orientation also needs to consider who the target
audience for a given incentive is. 59 Is it hospitals, as they make their decisions about capital purchases or staffing of departments? Doctors, as they
prescribe treatment? Insurers, as they decide what to cover and how much
to pay for it? Individuals, as they choose treatments? Pay-for-performance
is flexible enough to appeal to all of them. Hospitals can free up resources
by treating conditions in ways that are cheaper but as effective. Insurance
companies can improve fiscal health through lower-cost treatments and
lower demand as health improves. Individuals benefit by suffering less.
Doctors benefit through greater autonomy.
Any attempt to move towards a pay-for-performance system has certain prerequisites built into it. 60 First, providers need to know information
about cost structure, which involves learning about staff costs, staff time
per intervention, drug costs, and time spent waiting for open rooms or open
slots in a schedule. Providers need to dig deep into their procedures and
understand where potential efficiencies can be exploited. Second, reimbursement must be based on a standardized measure of health outcomes.
Some of this is definitional on the part of the initial diagnoses-which hip
replacements are garden variety and which present other factors that will
make them either easier or more difficult to treat. Some of this also depends on the ways in which health outcomes are defined-time to recovery, pain and suffering, or mortality. Third, outcomes need to be stored in
an apples-to-apples data format for easy comparison across institutions
and patient populations in order to measure the value created by a particular intervention or institution. Fourth, the healthcare system needs to
move beyond the viewpoint of the provider (whether an institution or a
department within that institution) and take a more holistic approach to the
health of an individual. What combination of action will improve the patient's health the most? This means avoiding cost-shifting from one department or organization to another and focusing, instead, on the total cost
of treatment. Such a focus might reveal that outpatient procedures are just
58.

Factors include the costs of measuring a particular outcome, the feasibility of measuring

that outcome, and issues concerning precision and inter-rater reliability.
59.
Laura A. Petersen et al., Does Pay-for-PerformanceImprove the Quality of Health Care?,

145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 265, 265 (2006).
60.

See Kaplan & Porter, supra note 47, at 52-58.
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as effective as inpatient procedures, or that phone calls rather than nurse
visits are effective forms of aftercare. More-and more intrusive-is not
always better, even in terms of efficacy. 61 An efficiency focus pushes institutions to act on what they learn about efficacy, whereas fee-for-service
pays institutions to ignore what they learn-if they bother to learn anything.62
There are many criticisms of pay-for-performance, focusing primarily on the difficulties of defining and measuring outcomes. Because these
criticisms also apply in a criminal justice context, and because criminal
justice is the focus of this Article, I will address them in Part IV.A. 63
III. CURRENT APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ECONOMICS

The general shortcomings of the medical fee-for-service model help
explain similar problems in the criminal justice context. A pay-for-performance approach might provide similar potential solutions. Comparing
criminal justice and healthcare economics comports with a long line of
viewing prisons themselves through the lens of medicine. Nineteenth century prison reformers were on board with the centralization of prisons under state control because they thought it would make them more professional and rehabilitative. 64 Wardens expressly invoked medical metaphors
to advocate on behalf of indeterminate sentences, saying that they alone
knew when an offender was cured. Health care also happens to be the centerpiece of the most significant prison case in a generation, Brown v.
Plata,'6 though Plata is about minimum standards-avoiding carceral
malpractice-rather than incentivizing quality and efficiency improve66
ments above the minimum. This Article proposes a measured return to
the medical model, albeit one that corrects for certain shortcomings ad-

61.
More can also be worse in medicine. Atul Gawande, Foreword: Positive Deviance and
Health Care to RICHARD T. PASCALE ET AL., THE POWER OF POSITIVE DEVIANCE, at ix, xi (2010)
("[S]tudies find that ... where doctors order more frequent tests and procedures, more specialist visits,
and more hospital admissions than the average-the patients do no better, whether measured in terms
of survival, ability to function, or satisfaction with care. If anything, they seem to do worse.").
62.
Some changes might imply new types of organizations to better treat certain segments of
the patient population. Porter envisages the creation of integrated practice units (IPUs) for the treatment of certain standard or chronic conditions. Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 53 (describing IPUs as
organized not by department and service, but "around the patient's medical condition"). By specializing in, say, diabetes, an IPU can develop expertise that should allow it to treat diabetic patients more
efficiently and effectively than a jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none medical practice could.
63.
1 should also note that Porter's analysis assumes that there is a market for medical providers.
Porter & Teisberg, supra note 47, at 65. Even though hospitals are a mix of for-profit and nonprofit
institutions, they all compete for patients and for insurance dollars. Porter's framework assumes that
more money can be directed to good performers and that positive and negative incentives can be directed at poor performers. Without a shift in funding and resources, the incentives available to promote
value-creation are limited. The same is true for corrections: dollars have to flow to promote valuecreation.
64.
For a general background and extensive references to more detailed historical treatments,
see Ball, Why State Prisons?,supra note 25, at 90-92.

65.
66.

563 U.S. 493 (2011).
Id. at 500.
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dressed infra in Part V. The historical emphasis on treatment is reintroduced with better (but not perfect) social science and much better ability
to crunch the data.
To start, health care and criminal justice are two of the fastest-grow67
ing areas of state budget expenditures. There is very little downward cost
pressure in either. Prison, in particular, is free to local decision makers,
except in unified corrections systems.6 9 This means that prison, the most
expensive-and maximally intrusive-treatment is likely to be used even
when it is unnecessary or when less intrusive and expensive alternatives
exist. No prosecutor or judge ever needs to measure the efficacy or efficiency of a prison sentence; providers in the criminal justice system are
not accountable in terms of creating value. 70 Various parts of the system
can get blamed for cost overruns or for particular outcomes, but the structure and operation of the system as a whole are seldom blamed. On the
contrary, the decentralized nature of criminal justice practically encourages the shifting of cost and blame. The prisons blame parole, parole
blames the prisons, the county blames the state, and the state blames the
county.
Even where there is some discussion of total costs of interventions,
these costs do not drive policies. In Missouri, for example, judges are presented with the costs of various sentencing options, but not their efficacy
or efficiency-the exact kind of misplaced incentives that Porter's value
formulation seeks to avoid. 7 1 A judge knows that jail is X dollars and
prison is Ydollars, but she does not know which works better-indeed, the
very question would probably seem strange. Best practices across jurisdictions and departments are diffused slowly, if at all. There are no financial
incentives to improve outcomes; at best, there are incentives to cut costs
without improving outcomes. Even if good policies are deployed, there are
no financial incentives to train people to deploy those policies with fidelity
to their design, to follow up about quality control and, generally, to ensure

67.

Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,

2009, at Al3.
However, for an analysis of the economic downturn on criminal justice systems, see HADAR
68.
AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
PUNISHMENT 14-15 (2015). Professor Aviram also points out that this focus on costs could result in
substandard care, what she calls "tough 'n' cheap," a valid complaint about the present system that a
value focus would address. Id at 164.

The following paragraph largely replicates the analysis found in W. David Ball, Defunding
69.
State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1061-63, 1075-78 (2014).
Two proposals in this regard serve as apt examples. See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informa70.
tional Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 50 (2008) (proposing prosecutors be regularly informed of the status of prison capacities); Russell M. Gold, PromotingDemocracy in Prosecution,86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (2011) (proposing that the costs of prosecution be
made public but using prosecutorial elections as the mechanism for internalizing the externality). But
DAs might not care at all about these costs unless they have to pay for them, either via their budgets
or at the ballot box.
Flanders, supra note 29, at 391.
71.
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that the policies are implemented well. Better policies are costs whose external benefits mostly make the jobs of those in other agencies easier. A
prisoner reformed by prison means more work for prison employees but
less work for police. A police officer who successfully defuses a situation
without arresting anyone might make more work for herself even as she
makes less work for the rest of the system.
Even the outcomes that are discussed, such as political claims about
deterrence and the effectiveness of particular sentences, are never put to
the test. The general rule is no data collection, no follow up, no outcome
tracking, and no feedback loops to decision makers such as judges and
DAs.72 This means there is little opportunity to learn, little opportunity to
improve, and little accountability. All sentencing is treated as downstream-someone else's problem. In fact, many law schools, which train
the judges and prosecutors who drive sentencing and charging, teach little
about prisons, even as first-year criminal law classes routinely address the
purpose of punishment.7 3
There is a spate of recent research analyzing the costs and benefits of
various approaches to crime. Darryl Brown outlined the approach in 2004,
discussing cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in detail (using, inter alia, environmental law as a comparison) and concluding, in part, that "[o]ffender
treatment . . . has fared well in cost-benefit analyses."7 4 Brown's analysis
is extensive, analyzing the wide-ranging effects of criminal justice policies
and discussing how prevention is effective and efficient, but his policy
prescriptions focus primarily on how CBA could be incorporated into the
executive branch (prosecution and police). Though he discusses the decentralized nature of criminal justice, he does not discuss the implications
of the prison subsidy, nor does he advocate pay-for-performance. A recent
issue of Criminology and Public Policy focused on the use of CBA in
criminal justice, with articles by Patricio Dominguez and Steven Raphael

&

72.
For an overview of the problem that focuses on California, see W. David Ball, E Pluribus
Unum: Data and Operations Integration in the CaliforniaCriminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L.
POL'Y REV. 277, 277-78, 280 (2010).
73.
Sharon Dolovich, Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 218, 218 (2012) ("It is during
the administration of punishment that the state's criminal justice power is at its zenith, and at this point
that the laws constraining the exercise of that power become most crucial. Yet it is precisely at this
point that the curriculum in most law schools falls silent.").
74.
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 323, 351

(2004).
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(providing a comprehensive summary of the issue),7 5 Michael Tonry,76 and
Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington,77 among others.
Criminal justice CBA approaches are not just theoretical; they have
gained traction in the policy realm as well. 78 The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) has long been considered a model program,
analyzing proposed policies in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency.79 WSIPP is now actively distributing its model via a partnership
with the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative8 0 and has posted an exhaustive technical documentation that breaks down exactly how it models
costs and benefits. 8 ' The Vera Institute and the Bureau of Justice Assistance have also partnered to promote CBA in criminal justice and have
produced a series of extremely informative, practitioner-centered publications. 82 The Justice Reinvestment Initiative of the Bureau of Justice Assistance is also working to promote data-driven policies that improve public

Patricio Dominguez & Steven Raphael, The Role of the Cost-of-Crime Literature in Bridg75.
ing the Gap Between Social Science Research and Policy Making: Potentialsand Limitations, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589, 589 (2015). The authors are particularly concerned about the way
in which the income levels of rich victims might skew the costs of crime and promote unequitable
distributional effects of resources like police, as well as the methodological problems with estimating
the costs of crime by either the contingent valuation or the willingness to pay methods. Id. at 599-600.
76.
Michael Tonry, The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing:Prison-

ers and Their Kids Suffer Too, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 653, 660-62 (2015) (emphasizing
problems with the cost of crime literature, pointing out that the costs of punishment-in terms of
hedonic losses to prisoners and collateral effects on their families-are not included in some of the
most influential cost of crime estimates).
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Monetary Value of Early Developmental Crime
77.
PreventionandIts Policy Significance, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 673, 675-76 (2015) (suggesting that if costs of offending are high, many social welfare programs will be justified).
78.
For an excellent overview, see CAMERON MCINTOSH & JOBINA Li, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN CRIME PREVENTION: THE WHY, HOW AND SO WHAT 3-11 (2012),
See also PEWhttps://www.publicsafety.gc.calcnt/rsrcs/pbletns/cnmc-nlss/cnmc-nss-eng.pdf.
MACARTHUR RESULTS FIRST INITIATIVE, STATES' USE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: IMPROVING
RESULTS FOR TAXPAYERS 9-12 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/2013/pewresultsfirst50statereportpdf.pdf.
79.
See, e.g., STEVE Aos, MARNA MILLER & ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS To REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES 2, 8-16 (2006), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/952/WsippEvidence-Based-Public-Policy-Options-to-Reduce-Future-Prison-ConstructionCriminal-Justice-Costs-and-Crime-RatesFull-Report.pdf.
80.
For a report on the New York State experience, see MARC SCHABSES, DIV. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., N.Y. STATE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEPLOYMENT AND
INITIAL APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS FIRSTCOST BENEFIT MODEL 1 (2013), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rf-technical report cbal_oct2013.pdf.
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, BENEFIT-COST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION 6-175
81.
(2016), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/TechnicalDocumentation/WsippBenefitCostTechnicalDocumenta-

tion.pdf.
82.
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 4 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/cba-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf; CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
USING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE POLICYMAKING 1 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Using-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-for-Justice-Policymaking.pdf; CARL MATTHIES,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, ADVANCING THE QUALITY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE
PROGRAMS 1 (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/advancing-thequality-of-cba.pdf; CARL MATTHIES & TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PUTTING A VALUE ON
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safety in a cost-effective manner, taking a holistic approach that includes
all parts of the criminal justice system (redistributing from less cost-effective programs, like prison, towards more cost-effective programs dealing
with prevention). The Obama Administration rolled out the Police Data
Initiative in 2015,84 the Data-Driven Justice Initiative in 2016,85 and recently published Economic Perspectives on Incarcerationand the Criminal Justice System, summarizing a host of cost-benefit research.86 There
have also been attempts for private entities to fund criminal justice improvements using "social impact bonds," with payment contingent on successful outcomes.
There is certainly much to admire in the CBA literature and policy.
What is missing, however, is a systematic discussion that goes beyond the
desirability vel non of individual policies. The literature needs a more holistic critique of why diffusion of sensible policies is not more widespread,
a critique that includes the ways in which the incentive structure of criminal justice-both institutional and budgetary-might contribute to the
problem. Prisons themselves are also inadequately considered as potential
sources of improved public safety.88 The thrust of this Article is not, then,
to replace CBA, but to provide a framework in which prisons and the individuals who sentence (and charge) offenders have incentives to insist on
best practices at the ground level. CBA will do very little if prison is free
to local decision makers and they have no incentive to pursue the social
good. Ultimately, good policies can only go so far on their merits. How
can the system be structured to encourage wider rollout and diffusion?
The economic literature engages with the incentives faced within the
system by providers of criminal justice. These articles are a recent discovery on my part and many advance the argument that misalignment is bound

CRIME ANALYSTS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 4 (2014),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Vera-CrimeAnalysts.pdf.
83.
JusticeReinvestment Initiative,OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/what isjri.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
84.
Megan Smith & Roy L. Austin, Jr., Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITE HOUSE:

BLOG (May 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-policedata-initiative.
85.
Christopher 1. Haugh, The White House Has a New Data-Driven Criminal-JusticeProject,
ATLANTIC (June 30, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/white-house-datacriminal-justice/489614.
86.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCriminal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf
87.
Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal
Justice Sector: New Challengesfor the Concept ofEvidence-Based Policy, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.

JUST. 395, 395-400 (2011) (noting advantages of payment by results and difficulties in determining
outcomes).
88.
Though Brown discusses the larger framework of criminal justice including issues of diffusion, alternative sentencing, and tailoring programs to needs in community prosecution, his otherwise
outstanding article gives only one paragraph to prison treatment itself. See Brown, supra note 74, at
351. He does discuss alternatives to incarceration later in some detail. Id. at 367-71.
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to happen when the state subsidizes prison while local governments control who goes there-an argument that predates the same analysis from
Zimring and Hawkins (the "correctional free lunch") I explored in earlier
articles.89 So, while Zimring and Hawkins coined the "correctional free
lunch" phrase, the idea predates them, and these prior formulations deserve to be more widely acknowledged in the legal academy. What follows
is my attempt to correct my own errors in this regard. (Many of the arguments discussed below are summarized in Kenneth Avio's excellent 1998
survey of the economic literature, The Economics ofPrisons.)90
In 1983, Robert Gillespie of the University of Illinois observed the
disjuncture between state payment for prison and local control over who
is sent there, proposing, as his solution to the inevitable overcrowding that
results, that the state instead allocate prison bed spaces to counties who
91
can then sell them to or buy them from other counties as needed. Fred
Giertz and Peter Nardulli made similar observations in 1985, describing
the "basic misalignment" between local governments who benefit from
prison and the fact that "these services are provided by state government
at virtually a zero cost to localities."9 2 Giertz and Nardulli suggested a
complete decentralization of the system, where incarceration is provided
93
by local government and funding is replaced with block grants. Nardulli
had earlier developed this idea in 1984 in an article which analyzed county
usage of prisons in Illinois, again starting with the premise that "local pol94
iticians have funded law and order campaigns at state expense." Alfred
Blumstein and Richard Larson in 1969 analyzed the disjointed nature of
the criminal justice system, remarking that the independence of agencies
inhibited the effective deployment of interdependent policies, and that
criminal justice organizations failed to get feedback about the downstream
95
effects of those policies on other agencies.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991).
89.
For my own elaboration on the subject, see Ball, A False Idea, supranote 25, at 27; Ball, supra note
69, at 1061-62; Ball, supranote 35, at 988; Ball, Why State Prisons?, supranote 25, at 77-82.

90.

Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143-44 (1998).

Robert W. Gillespie, AllocatingResources to Prison Space: An Economic Approach Incor91.
porating Efficiency andEquity 1-6 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Commerce & Bus. Admin., Working Paper

No. 977, 1983).
J. Fred Giertz & Peter F. Nardulli, Prison Overcrowding, 46 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1985).
92.
Id. at 75-77. For my own treatment, which unintentionally duplicates theirs, see Ball, supra
93.
note 69, at 1072-75. For a similar idea, see Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Could Economics Solve the

Prison Crisis?, 57 PROB. J. 263, 276-77 (2010).
Peter F. Nardulli, The Misalignment of Penal Responsibilities and State Prison Crises:
94.
Costs, Consequences, and CorrectiveActions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 365, 368 (1984).
Alfred Blumstein & Richard Larson, Models of a Total Criminal Justice System, 17
95.
OPERATIONS RES. 199, 199-200 (1969).
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In 1993, Charles Logan wrote an article entitled Criminal Justice
Performance Measuresfor Prisons, but he focused on processes, not outcomes, and did so from a retributive perspective.96 He paid little attention
to the decentralization and organizational incentives problems, whereby,
say, poor rehabilitation by prisons might result in increased workloads for
police. Logan's approach is also typical of the other works cited here, including my own, in that it assumes that there are no differences-or no
differences that can be measured-among particular institutions' custodial
rehabilitation programs.9 7 The main gains are from early prevention and
diversion. This Article, however, assumes that there are better and worse
prisons and programs and thus, that prisons should be differentiated.
Much of the rest of the economics literature's focus is on "factors that
affect the supply of criminal activities"-that is, what incentives and policies tend to make people more or less likely to engage in criminal activity
in the first place. 9 8 This is also true of the most influential analyses in law
and economics. To cite perhaps the most influential example, Richard Posner's treatment of the law and economics of criminal law is all about the
supply of crime and the ways in which criminals might respond to the relative costs of gainful and illicit employment, based on the risks and rewards of each. 99 In so doing, Posner built upon Gary Becker's seminal
1968 article, Crime and Punishment:an Economic Approach, which itself
is also primarily about the economics of criminal activity. 00 Both Becker
and Posner treat the system as a passive respondent to homo economicus,
rather than something that, through treatment, could actively alter criminal
tendencies one way or another. Incapacitation is taken as the primary
means by which crime can be controlled, subject to the supply elasticity
of other criminals (i.e., the extent to which new criminals enter the market
to replace those sent to prison).10' In general, this approach is an example
of what Thomas Bernard and Robin Engel have criticized as an overly

96.
Charles H. Logan, CriminalJustice Performance Measuresfor Prisons, in PERFORMANCE
MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19, 19-21 (1993) (focusing "more on the satisfaction
of certain standards, values, and constraints than on the production of particular consequences").
97.
My analysis has previously focused on prisons versus local dispositions like jails and probation. See, e.g., Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 76. 1 argued that unless prisons were
demonstrably superior, they should not be subsidized. Id. at 87-88. 1 did not distinguish among prisons, however, and for the purposes of the analysis presented, was agnostic about their capacity to
rehabilitate. Id. at 88.
98.
Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Crime, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
3529, 3541 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); see, e.g., Samuel Cameron, The Economics
of Crime Deterrence:A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 301 (1988).
99.
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,

1205-15 (1985).
100.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
169 (1968). Frank Easterbrook also uses the prevention/deterrence model in his argument that criminal
procedures are merely price mechanisms in a plea-bargaining market. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedureas a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289-90 (1983).
101.
For a law and economics analysis of how crime moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due
to enforcement and policy differences, see Doron Teichman, The Market for CriminalJustice: Feder-

alism, Crime Control, and JurisdictionalCompetition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1849-50 (2005).
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narrow theoretical approach to the criminal justice system: too much analysis is bounded by organizational silos, and too little takes on a broader,
system-wide, cross-agency perspective. 02
I propose that reformers should combine cost-benefit analysis that
identifies promising programs with organizational incentives to adopt
them, all within the framework of value creation: improving public safety
outcomes per dollar spent.
IV. CREATING VALUE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

What are the ways in which we might restructure the criminal justice
system-or particular parts of the system-in order to create value? In
Section A, I discuss some practical and theoretical groundwork that must
first be laid. As stated in the introduction, this Article is not model legislation ready to be implemented-it is a map into relatively uncharted territory with only the core defining features sketched out. In Section B, I
focus on particular applications in sentencing that could fit into a performance-based system. In Section C, I outline the advantages of such a system.
A. Measurement Issues, Theoretical and Practical
If the health experience is any indication, the initial move to begin to
categorize similar cases (the criminal equivalent of DRGs) and improve
quality will be a long, iterative process that involves some theoretical work
and a lot of on-the-ground work. In fact, criminal justice might not even
be ready for outcome-based measurements-health care first went through
a series of procedural fixes (qualifications, training, accreditation, professionalization) from the mid-1850s to the present that parts of the criminal
justice system might still need.1 03 Measurements in medicine are proposed,
tested, adopted, refined, and sometimes replaced. The question is not
whether a given measurement works in theory, but in practice. Porter, for
example, has been criticized for glossing over the logistical problems of
defining and measuring health outcomes in the real world,1 04 but Medicare
Thomas J. Bernard & Robin Shepard Engel, Conceptualizing Criminal Justice Theory, 18
102.
JUST. Q. 1, 2-3 (2001).
STARR, supra note 23, at 22 ("Standardization of training and licensing became the means
103.
for realizing both the search for authority and control of the market."). Michele Deitch and Michael
Mushlin have long argued for some form of correctional oversight to promote and enforce best practices. See, e.g., Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, Op-ed, What's Going on in Our Prisons?,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2016, at A19.
104.
See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Reform: Porter and Teisberg's Utopian Vision,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2006), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/10/health-reform-porterand-teisbergs-utopian-vision. There are other criticisms as well. Doctors do not see themselves as contributing to cost overruns. See Alvin Tran, Study: Doctors Look to Others to Play Biggest Role in
Curbing Health Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 23, 2013), http://khn.org/news/study-doctorslook-to-others-to-play-biggest-role-in-curbing-health-costs. Some doctors see data collection as interfering with medical treatment. Robert M. Wachter, Op-ed, How Measurement Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2016, at SR5. The current data do not support the efficiency of pay-for-performance. Martin
Emmert et al., Economic Evaluation of Pay-for-Performancein Health Care:A Systematic Review,
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and commercial insurers recently did exactly that, agreeing to common
health outcome measurements. 05
The problems in health care have analogues in criminal justice, and I
will only identify them here, not solve them. In criminal justice, the notion
of quality may seem difficult to begin to get our heads around, even as
there is growing support for data collection and evidence-based practices.
Stakeholders will need to gather and figure out what quality treatment
means and how we will measure it.106 These definitions cannot be generated by academic fiat. A careful study of the history of health quality measurements should provide some insights into the political and organizational dynamics that underlay the gradual shift in health from fee-for-service to pay-for-performance. Space and time do not permit me to construct
a detailed history of these changes, but it should certainly be among the
top priorities of a criminal justice performance-based research agenda.
What follows are some problem areas to be addressed. Perhaps they
cannot be resolved at all. But the same has also been said of medicine, and
even if existing measures of health are subject to revision, they are widely
accepted enough to be driving policy (and preferable to a fee-for-service
alternative). They all revolve around a central question: which outcomes?
One initial observation is that outcomes should be measured across
the system, not in terms of the individual, media-generating case. There
will be failure in the system; that does not mean the system has failed.
People die of cancer at the best cancer hospitals; so too might we expect
some degree of criminal justice failure. This means shifting the focus to
success rates, not individual cases; to how the system is doing overall and
at what cost. The examination of sensational individual cases too often
results in "never again, no matter what the cost" policies. 0 7
The second observation is that different conditions and treatments
will need to be measured with different metrics. The healthcare economics
literature, for example, does not have an exclusive focus on a single measure of health but, instead, looks to multiple measures. Porter, for example,
divides health outcomes into three general categories: mortality, recovery,
13 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 755, 756 (2012). For an overview of some of the key questions that need to
be answered in order to actualize a pay-for-performance system, see Petersen et al., supranote 59, at

265.
105.
Bruce Japsen, Medicare, Commercial InsurersAgree on Uniform Health QualityMeasures,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/02/16/whitehouse-says-medicare-commercial-insurers-agree-on-health-quality-measures.
106.
Again, if healthcare reform is any indication, the attempt to start to measure and hold accountable certain members of the criminal justice system will be met with resistance from DAs, judges,
and others at the power centers of today's criminal justice system. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
107.
Matt Taibbi, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Shame of Three Strikes Laws, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/cruel-and-unusual-punishmentthe-shame-of-three-strikes-laws-20130327 (discussing the history of the sensational cases that led to
the passage of Three Strikes in California and reporting the results of polls that showed "[p]eople will
pay for justice, no matter how much it costs").
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and health.108 These might be mapped onto recidivism, modality of treatment, and desistance from crime.
Mortality is the most obvious measure in health; in criminal justice,
that measure is recidivism. A pessimist might rightly conclude that there
is no consensus on what constitutes recidivism.1 09 An optimist might look
at the same set of facts and conclude that a variety of measures could be
used. For example, metrics like arrest for any offense, re-arrest for the
same crime, and return to prison could all be used to measure recidivism.
Again, the minimum requirement is that measurements are agreed to and
that they lend themselves to apples-to-apples comparisons across jurisdictions. It is an open question as to which definition is preferable. Is it total
desistance from crime? A reduction in the number of offenses? A reduction in offenses by each person or an average reduction across populations
of similar offenders? A reduction in the severity of the types of crime
(moving from violent offenses to property offenses)? Reductions which
control for certain variables (aging out)? These choices might depend on
the type of offender or on which garners the most support from practitioners.
The next thing to consider is the modality of treatment through the
lens of efficacy and efficiency. Bentham's utilitarianism, for example, explicitly takes the prisoner's cost (hedonic and otherwise) of punishment
into account, meaning that, ceterisparibus, the least restrictive alternative
that yields the same result is the most welfare-promoting.' 1o This suggests
that, at least in some cases, the harms caused by the criminal justice system
outweigh any benefits. Net widening, in other words, is both resource intensive and ineffective, and pay-for-performance should help restrain it.
For cases which require some response, pay-for-performance would help
limit the size and scope of the intervention. Prison, for example, is expensive and imposes a variety of collateral harms on a prisoner's family (both
emotional harms on families and children, as well as economic harms due
to a variety of wealth-extracting contracts for telephones, commissary

108.
Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, at 2479-80; see also id. app. I at 1-12 (going into
much greater detail about the value concept); id app. 2 at 1-14 (discussing issues with outcome measurement and how to categorize outcomes into a hierarchy).

109.
(2014).

Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures ofRecidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 799-800

110.
Michael Tonry observes that, in Bentham's view, "everyone's happiness-including that of
offenders-counts." Tonry, supra note 76, at 661; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr. 1986) (1789) ("But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be
admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.").
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money, etc.)."' Prison might also be criminogenic.11 2 If So, it is both inefficient and ineffective. But even assuming prison "works," its efficacy
might not be enough to outweigh its inefficiency: we might be able to do
as well with less. These are empirical questions already being studied. My
argument is simply that these questions are important and should be answered; I am not claiming to have the answers myself.
Porter also considers patient experience during the "process of recovery": a successful treatment that is shorter and less painful is more desirable than one that is longer and more painful.' 13 The same should be said of
punishment. We should seek to do the least amount necessary to get results, and we should explicitly consider suffering. Suffering should be
tested like any other factor; it should be a goal only insofar as it works. If
people can stop being criminals as effectively without suffering, then, unless suffering is desirable for its own sake, there is no point to it.114
Finally, where Porter suggests health as the ultimate measure, I would
substitute "desistance from crime" and other pro-social metrics. This
might look different for certain subpopulations. Metrics for homeless offenders might mean hospital days avoided or days without them being assaulted. Metrics for the mentally ill might involve medication uptake or
stability of housing. Metrics for drug-using offenders might vary by drug
(heroin users might have one set of metrics, meth users might have another, recidivist drunk-driving offenders might have still others). Again,
the value-creation framework states that any criminal justice intervention-including none-should make people better (or the same) for the
same amount of resources (or less). For the above populations, alternatives
to criminal justice involvement must be considered. There is much evidence to suggest that criminalizing the incidents of homelessness, mental
illness, and drug abuse is not nearly as effective or efficient as the noncriminal alternatives. A complete analysis, in other words, must consider
whether criminal justice is called for at all. We would not hospitalize
111.
For emotional harms, see Joseph Murray, The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and
Children of Prisoners, in THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 442, 442-444 (Alison Liebling & Shadd
Maruna eds., 2005). For economic harms, see Daniel Wagner, Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive
Customers, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 30, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/30/15761/prison-bankers-cash-captive-customers ("Taken together, the costs imposed by [prison banking vendors], phone companies, prison store operators and corrections agencies
make it far more difficult for poor families to escape poverty so long as they have a loved one in the
system.").
112.
Cullen, Jonson & Nagin, supra note 30, at 51S (arguing that, for some offenders, prison
might have a criminogenic effect.).
113.
Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, app. 2 at 4.
114.
In making this suggestion I take no position on the recent scholarship that explores the
effects of hedonic adaptation on the typical prison experience. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience ofPunishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1463, 1463-64 (2010). My criticism is not with the way suffering is measured, just with the assumption that suffering itself advances other penological goals such as deterrence, conveying a message of
disapproval, etc. Hedonic adaptation has some empirical basis; the idea that the rational-expectations
hypothesis applies to the justice-involved and that the suffering of prison is part of each prisoner's net
present value calculation has much less.
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someone who arrived at the Emergency Room with a hangnail. We would
tell them to go home. For at least some cases in criminal justice, the same
principle applies.
In addition to goal-based considerations about what outcomes to
measure, there are also program and policy implications. Outcomes should
control for exogenous factors. A macroeconomic downturn resulting in
higher overall unemployment will affect ex-offender unemployment, as
might sector-specific unemployment (such as that for unskilled labor).
Outcomes must also consider the full spectrum of treatment-not just interventions given in prison, but interventions in community supervisionsubject to the principle of parsimony. These variables should be scalar and
avoid the presumption of perfection-measuring better or worse, not success or failure. Binary measures will, by and large, measure failure: justiceinvolved individuals have below-average educational and economic endowments.1 15 We might therefore consider time in the community before
returns to custody as the measurement, not complete desistance from crime
(assuming that a return to custody is a true measure of criminal activity,
not simply an artifact of detection-which is also a confounding variable
in medicine).' 16 In other words, merely lumping in all returns to custody
as failures of equal degree fails to account for the differences between
those who stay out of trouble one day and those who stay out of trouble
much longer.
It is unlikely that there will be a single metric for every case, but it is
nevertheless important to remind ourselves that public safety should be the
organizing principle. Our theories of punishment involve incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, but these justifications need to
be tied to their effects on public safety and measured using common definitions in common data formats. Proponents of particular theories should
have falsifiable tests to determine why and how their theories (and the
mechanisms that apply to them) work, then measure and test those hypotheses. Within the concept of value creation, we will avoid both cost cutting
for its own sake as well as stated claims about efficacy that do not consider
efficiency.
Is "public safety value creation" too vague to be useful? Consider that
the focus on improving health outcomes is now embedded within the
healthcare policy community. There is substantial agreement that costs
and quality must be considered, and the discussion explicitly references
these goals, even as particular measurements of these goals and the means

115.

Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration& SocialInequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 8-10

(2010).
For an example ofjust such an approach, see Peter Schmidt & Ann Dryden Witte, Predict116.
ing Criminal Recidivism Using 'Split Population'Survival Time Models, 40 J. ECONOMETRICS 141,

141, 144, 151-55 (1989).
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to achieve them are disputed.' 17 The same is not true now of criminal justice. We seldom consider costs of individual interventions even as we bemoan the costs in aggregate. We almost never operationalize the idea that
prison treatment programs might meaningfully affect public safety outcomes. At least agreeing that our criminal justice system should be as effective as possible for the money we spend on it is an important step. This
step must include asking whether a criminal justice response creates as
much value as treating the problem non-criminally or even doing nothing.
Most of the work will not take place at the level of abstraction that "public
safety value creation" implies. It will instead involve meetings with stakeholders, policymakers, and consumers and will involve much painstaking,
granular work. But having public safety outcomes as a guiding principle
will tie together the many strands of policy and theoretical work currently
taking place. The alternative is to throw up our hands, avoid the difficult
work, and accept a system that few would or could defend as just, effective, or economical.
B. Value CreatingPolicies
In this Section, I will sketch out what policies might arise from a public safety value creation framework. A few caveats before the discussion
continues. First, this is a framework, not a particular endorsement of any
one metric or program; it is important to be open to new data and new
studies. The principle of measuring, analyzing, and incentivizing outcome-oriented programs is a procedure, a formula which isolates the variables but does not necessarily solve for X Second, I assume both that it is
possible to know what works and also possible that something will workor at least that something will not work as badly as other things or be as
bad but cheaper. That is, our system can at least be made more efficient,
even if not more effective.
There are also certain conditions that I assume would be built into the
system.'
In an outcome-based system, localities would be prevented
from shifting crime and criminals to other jurisdictions-the "one-way bus
ticket" model of crime control. 9 also assume that there would be some
kind of validated risk-needs assessment tool used, subject to some conditions I will discuss infra. Both sending and receiving parties would have
incentives to measure risk: receiving institutions would not want to take
on a harder case-with higher costs and higher risk of poor outcomesthan they were promised, and sending institutions would want to ensure
that a prisoner's criminogenic needs were met. This would solve the
cream-skimming problem so often seen in the private prison context,

117.
Reinhardt, supra note 104 (criticizing the idea that medical conditions are easy to identify,
discrete, and easy to put into "a standard, finite life cycle").
118.
The following discussion draws on a prior article. See Ball, supra note 69, at 1061-63.
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Id at 1086-87.
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where the average cost of a prisoner is equated with the marginal cost of
that prisoner.
A pay-for-performance criminal justice system would first begin with
financial and budgetary reforms that would give decision makers some incentives to save money and promote effectiveness. To the extent that localities were given block grants to approach crime in the manner of their
choosing, these grants would have to be subject to income adjustment,
giving more resources to poorer areas and those with higher crime.1 20 The
system would need to tailor sentences to the risk factors a given offender
presented. It would make the entire menu of sentencing options look a lot
like probation does now, with some attempt to link offender characteristics
to penological conditions. Finally, pay-for-performance might also include indeterminate sentencing, whereby offenders were released as soon
as, but not until, they were "better." Within a pay-for-performance framework, however, both prisoners and parole boards would have specific indicia of readiness to return-whether a prisoner addressed his or her underlying diagnosis-rather than generic estimates of threats to society. I
will now discuss each in turn.
Budgets and Data. Under pay-for-performance, budgets would have
to be revamped along performance-oriented lines. I have previously proposed that states no longer fund prison, per se, but that they fund on the
basis of rates of reported violent crime.121 This is a potential restructuring
that would enable greater local freedom of choice in how offenders are
treated, but it is not the only way to encourage pay-for-performance. Federal funds could be disbursed with the requirement that states adopt outcome measurement or data collection.122 States could then base funding
streams to localities on certain baseline standards. Depending on the funding approach used, jurisdictions could conceivably experiment with different approaches to incarceration. Some might invest in mass lockups to
incapacitate-subject to Eighth Amendment limitations. Others might pay
to make people better. Still others might decide that non-criminal responses are called for. This too would provide valuable feedback on the
efficacy of various approaches-approaches which, it should be noted,
currently take place at the intra-state level but which are opaque to voters
3
and officials alike. 12
As for data, the relatively uncontroversial issues that would need to
be implemented to make pay-for-performance viable are, in most cases,
120.
121.

Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1073.

122.
Darryl Brown has also suggested that the federal government fund cost-benefit studies.
Brown, supra note 74, at 353. Though the federal government has less of a financial impact with
criminal justice than it does in medicine-Medicaid and Medicare are significant enough by themselves to generate change while JAG grants are not. See Zack Cooper et al., The PriceAin't Right?
Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21815, 2015) (criticizing studies that rely only on Medicare data while noting that
Medicare covers twenty percent of total health care spending).

123.

See Ball, supranote 35, at 994.
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issues that need to be addressed for the system to be effectively managed.
This means collecting data in standard formats, data that includes a sufficiently long time horizon that is also linked to offender behavior in other
jurisdictions. This is not a new idea, and it is one where having the idea is
a small part of the job. Saying that the idea of data collection is uncontroversial does not mean its implementation would be; deciding what to
measure and how to measure it is where most of the work would take
place. Implementation would involve effecting institutional and cultural
changes, getting buy-in from practitioners, and hashing out what those
standard measurements and formats would be. Once data is collected, organizations must use it to drive practices and policies. Change needs to be
ongoing and iterative. Those who subsidize these institutions can tie budgets to best practices, incentivizing the propagation, diffusion, and experimentation needed. Finally, data needs not only to be collected, it needs to
be analyzed and shared. A judge now, for example, really only sees the
results of her decisions when they fail and an offender returns to court.
Judges should, instead, be educated about how their populations performed in aggregate, looking at success and failure rates, survival times,
prosocial indicators, and the like for all of those they deal with, not just
the individuals who return to court for an infraction. They should, moreover, be encouraged to look not just at successes, but whether their successes came with the minimum effective dose of resources. More is not
always better-and, indeed, can sometimes be worse.
Tailoring. The next issue the system would deal with is tailoring.
What is a DRG for criminal justice? In order to measure the outcomes
generated by the intervention-as opposed to the selection effects of a
given population-we must control for variations in the initial condition
of offenders. That is, if remuneration is based upon doing a good job, we
have to be able to distinguish between results that stem from a given population being better than another and a given treatment being better than
another. How do we control for differences between cases and among populations? Consider the following individual examples. The crime of arrest
might understate the risk a given individual poses-as, for example, a traffic charge for an organized crime kingpin. The crime of arrest might overstate the risk an individual poses-as, for example, a battered wife killing
her abusive husband. This is certainly among the thorniest parts of actuarialism, as making decisions on risk alone involves non-actuarial decisions about what behavior should be modeled (and how). It is hardly an
answer to say that risk assessment tools might at least do a more accurate
job than the clinical, gut-level assessment of judges and prosecutors. The
larger question, though, of what constitutes a "similar" offense and a "similar" offender is vexing and will probably never be conclusively resolved.1 24

124.

See Ball, supra note 69, at 1064-70.
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The problem with standardizing diagnoses, an obvious problem for
criminal justice, is not without its analog in medicine. Witness the New
York Times Magazine column "Diagnosis," which presents symptoms and
asks doctors to figure out the cause (or causes).1 2 5 There are biological
markers for most diseases, but some, like prostate cancer, might actually
turn out to be several different diseases.1 2 6 Co-morbidity also makes diagnoses difficult: those who suffer from two or more diseases need to be
treated differently, have different survival rates, and the like.1 27 Co-mor-

bidity is a readily apparent problem in criminal law, given how many of
the justice-involved have mental health or addiction problems.1 2 8 The issue
of optimal research trial size poses problems in medicine: larger sizes are
more statistically significant, but larger groups are also less tailored, resulting in medical protocols that are demonstrably ineffective for certain
subpopulations on the basis of gender or race.129 The healthcare approach,
then, outlines some typical hazards without necessarily pointing out easy
solutions, but reformers who, say, want to address offenders with co-morbid drug and mental health problems can look to the medical literature for
ideas and approaches.
Some of the discussion about distinguishing and tailoring in criminal
justice has already taken place in the offense/offender literature1 3 0 and suggests that we could combine criminal history and offender characteristics
at sentencing (though even criminal histories can be problematic on disparate impact grounds, as well as on accuracy and completeness). One
125.
See Lisa Sanders, Diagnosis,N.Y. TIMES MAG., http://www.nytimes.com/column/diagnosis. "Dr. Lisa Sanders recreates hard-to-solve medical cases" in this column of the magazine. Id.
126.
See Charlie Cooper, Prostate Cancer Could Actually Be Five Different Diseases, Say Scientists, INDEPENDENT (July 30, 2015, 00:16), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-andfamilies/health-news/prostate-cancer-could-actually-be-five-different-diseases-say-scientists-

10424973.html. Other than DUI there are not many biological markers for criminal law. Criminology's main foray into biological markers was phrenology, which is a continuing stain on the discipline.

See Paul Erickson, The Anthropology ofCharles Caldwell, MD., 72 Isis 252,253-56 (1981) (detailing
the career of an American phrenologist who used biological differences in head shape to support white
supremacist views); Reginald Horsman, Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nine-

teenth Century, 27 AM. Q. 152, 155 (1975) (discussing Caldwell and "scientific" appeals to the racial
inferiority of indigenous people); Nicole Rafter, The Murderous Dutch Fiddler: Criminology, History
and the Problem ofPhrenology, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 68 (2005) (arguing that criminologists should come to terms with phrenology's role in the development of criminology).
127.
For criticism of Porter's ideas on these grounds, see Gail R. Wilensky, Health Reform:
Thinking Big, but Ignoring Big Obstacles, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2006), http://healthaf-

fairs.org/blog/2006/10/16/health-reform-thinking-big-but-ignoring-big-obstacles/

(noting

that

"[p]atients have a nasty habit of having more than one thing wrong with them" and observing that
"multiple chronic conditions account for a disproportionate share" of Medicare spending).
128.
"At midyear 2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem .. . ." DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. "In 2002 more than two-thirds ofjail inmates were found to be dependent on
or to abuse alcohol or drugs . . . ." JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL
INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf.

129.

Nicholas J. Schork, Time for One-Person Trials, 520 NATURE 609, 609-10 (2015).

130.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, DistinguishingOffense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 287 (2005).
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place to start would be with regular risk-needs assessments (RNAs) as a
non-exclusive foundation for criminal justice programming, with several
caveats. RNAs need to have open algorithms and data so that the means
by which risk scores are calculated can be examined and independently
verified. Defendants should be allowed to challenge the methodologies in
court.' 3 RNAs should be normed to subpopulations to ensure that there is

no disparate impact on the basis of race or other suspect classifications.1 32
They should also be re-validated on local populations every couple of
years. In short, the move towards evidence-based practices requires actual
evidence-evidence that is subject to robust investigation, testing, and
standards of proof. RNAs have to actually be accurate; it is not simply
enough to put a number on risk and take it on faith. One would expect that
as data collection and outcome measurement improve, risk-needs assessment tools would also improve. The problems with risk-needs assessments, however, are dwarfed by the problems with gut decisions of judges
and DAs, which are even less transparent and accountable-and more subject to bias, explicit or implicit-than RNAs.133
Tailoring should not stop with the diagnosis. It also, of course, should
include treatment. This is where the criminal justice system as a whole
should start to look a lot more like probation and diversion. Some people
are inpatients, some are outpatients, some are nonpatients. Currently we
do have diversion to probation and treatment, but we also just send people
to "prison"-not different kinds of prisons (those decisions are made by
prison officials during classification) or different kinds of programs (those
are also done by the prison system). Tailoring prison terms at sentencing
currently just means "more" or "less." Prison is expensive. We should be
considering what we get for that money. It does not make sense to say
"you are a criminal, you get prison" the same way it would not make sense
for a doctor to say "you are sick, get medical help." Doctors diagnose patients with particular illnesses and prescribe particular treatments, including, sometimes, realizing that the situation will resolve itself. This should
be the goal of the criminal justice system-we should at least scrutinize
fee-for-service subsidies of prison, the most expensive treatment we use.
Tailoring would be a radical change-albeit one that was common during
the Williams v. New York34 era.
There are questions of how much dis-

131.
See Martinson, supranote 10, at 50.
132.
ProPublica reported that a proprietary risk assessment tool used in Florida underestimated
the risk posed by white members of the pretrial population and overestimated the risk posed by African-American members. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. For a similar argument in the sentencing context, see Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific RationalizationofDiscrimination,66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805-08 (2014).
133.
For a discussion of implicit bias and its impact on the law generally, see IMPLICIT RACIAL
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW I (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).

134.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).

135.

Id. at 244-46.
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cretion a judge should have to find facts (subject to the underlying sentencing statutes and whether they, in turn, implicate Apprendi v. New Jerseyl36 and its progeny). 137 There are also issues about whether long sentences would ever generate the kind of feedback a judge would needpresumably judges would die or retire before the end of certain extremely
long sentences. But surely our currently broken system, which simply enables long sentences with no questions asked, is worse. Not asking questions does not mean such sentences are more effective or parsimonious; it
simply means we have no way to know whether they are effective or parsimonious.
Which prisons? The value framework could obviously fit into contracts with private prisons, encouraging a focus not just on cost per prisoner but paying for treatment of an offender's criminogenic needs. Jurisdictions could track and pay for outcomes, adjusting for the risk profile of
those who went in. The alternative embeds undesirable outcomes. A private prison contract that focuses only on price, for example, creates incentives for private prisons to "cream skim" only the most low-cost prisoners,
meaning those who are younger, physically healthier, and less mentally ill.
A value-creation framework would reduce the reimbursement price of
those prisoners, making sure that the outcome is measured in terms of how
people changed in prison, not just how they were when they went in. The
value framework could also provide incentives to maximize pro-social
outcomes, such as educational attainment in prison,' 38 or longitudinal outcomes such as employment and family relationships. Without some outcome measurement, contracts that pay a simple per-prisoner-per-day
amount create a potential incentive not to treat prisoners in hopes of ensuring a future revenue stream from recidivism. 139 Others have suggested
different pay-for-performance models, including a prison re-admission
40
penalty similar to those used in hospitals.1

136.

530 U.S. 466 (2000).

See id. at 490 ("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
137.
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,313-14 (2004) (extending the doctrine to state sentencing guidelines).
138.

See David M. Siegel, InternalizingPrivate PrisonExternalities:Let's Start with the GED,

30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109-10 (2016).
Kenneth L. Avio, Remuneration Regimes for Private Prisons, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
139.
35,45 (1993); see also Michael G. Anderson, IfYou've Got the Money, I've Got the Time: The Benefits
ofIncentive Contracts with PrivatePrisons, 34 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 85-88 (2015-2016) (suggesting payments based on drug and mental health treatment, as well as educational, vocational, and life
skills attainment); Anita Mukherjee, Impacts of Private Prison Contracting on Inmate Time Served

and Recidivism 9-10 (Aug. 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2523238 (evaluating empirical evidence
that contractual incentives incentivize private prisons to prolong stays via disciplinary write-ups).
Stuart M. Butler, Op-ed, How Hospitals Could Help Cut Prison Recidivism, BROOKINGS
140.
(Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-hospitals-could-help-cut-prison-recidivism.
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Beyond the private prison option, the state could also treat stateowned and -administered prisons in a similar manner. State prisons could
specialize in particular populations, charging differential rates to localities
based on prisoners' underlying needs and on the treatments used. Currently, the system does not generally differentiate among prisons within
the system. But why not make one prison for domestic abusers, another
for addiction-driven behavior, and the like? Programming in prison can
vary: perhaps some will specialize in restorative justice,141 others with animal-based rehabilitation.1 4 2 Prisons can also differ on the basis of location, size, guard training, and theory. Perhaps prisons in the United States
can look internationally for other examples-Scandinavian prisons approach prisons and prisoners in dramatically different ways. 143 Variety in
theory and practice is also a return to the historical origin of state prisons,
when wardens had great leeway to pursue different methods.
Each prison could focus on needs, and those needs could be measured, treated, and the treatment assessed in terms of how well it worked
and at what cost. Prisons could subsequently move toward best practices,
nudged, in part, by the demands of the localities paying for prison beds.
No longer would we treat all prisons and all prisoners the same. Systems
would, instead, have some idea of what kind of prison and what kinds of
programs would be in operation once someone got there.
Discharge. Sentence lengths could be limited at the time they are imposed and potentially extended before release-that is, systems could return to indeterminate sentencing (those sentences terminating in parole release). The problem with indeterminate sentences as they are practiced in
some states like California is that the ultimate length of the sentence is
unlimited (e.g., twenty-five years to life).144 There is no incentive for parole boards to release prisoners; their only incentive is to avoid the spectacular failure, not to promote the quiet success.145 Other states have maximum limits on indeterminate sentences (e.g., four to eight years, where
release is possible after four years but must be done by year eight).146 A
return to indeterminate sentencing would be a return to the medical model
of imprisonment with a few improvements, notably that there was some

141.

See generally HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Howard Zehr

ed., 2014).
142.

See generally Gennifer Furst, Prison-Based Animal Programs: A National Survey, 86

PRISON J. 407 (2006).
143.

See generally John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era ofPenal Excess, 48 BRIT.

J. CRIMINOLOGY 119(2007).
144.
For a detailed discussion of the California scheme, see W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious,
and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning ofPunishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.

893, 899-900 (2009).
145.

See W. David Ball, Normative Elements ofParole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 395,

398 (2011).
146.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 9756(a)-(b)

(2016) (establishing a maximum term of confine-

ment and a minimum term of confinement that is one-half as long; parole may be granted after the
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understanding of what needs an offender had to address to be eligible for
release (e.g., go to prison and work on your vocational skills or anger management).
Indeterminate sentences in a system that internalized costs and benefits would generate pressure to release safer prisoners and avoid the problem of life sentences "with the possibility of parole, hold the possibility of
parole." 47 Other parts of the system would be clamoring to use the money
spent on incarceration to promote higher value interventions. Funds not
spent on discretionary years of an indeterminate sentence could be redistributed. For example, local jurisdictions might pay prisons for a certain
amount of time for a given condition (X years for a domestic abuser), with
the potential for earlier release (and cost savings to the carceral institution)
but a delayed performance payment based on survival time without recidivism. States could reimburse localities for a given amount of prison time
that amounts to a valuation of just deserts, and localities could pay for
additional prison time to either vindicate local retributive values or to promote treatment-and, of course, they would be able to shop around for
prison beds at particular institutions that did a good job. Another option
would be to localize parole boards. Individuals from a given community
would decide when a prisoner was ready to come home, knowing that
prison savings could go to lower taxes or to prevention programs. This
would more accurately balance social costs and benefits.
Indeterminate sentencing was criticized in the mid-1970s for a variety of reasons. I will not address one of the criticisms-that it did not promote uniformity of punishment-since one of the main advantages to indeterminate sentencing is the very fact that punishment can be tailored.
Some of the non-uniformity criticisms were, at their core, about racial disparities in who was released and who was denied. Using risk-needs and
having an outcome-based approach would make release decisions and
their effects on racial subgroups less opaque. If risk assessments amounted
to a policy, rather than the clinical assessment of an individual employee,
they could actually provide those suffering disparate impact with a
stronger claim to sue the agency for violations of constitutional rights under § 1983.148 Parole officials would no longer have unfettered (and unguided) discretion; they would actually know what they were looking for
in terms of criminogenic needs to be addressed before release. Prison capitation fees paid by locals could solve for the problem of indefinite retention-there would be pressure to let prisoners out in order to free up funds
that could be put to use elsewhere. At the very least, it is not as though
determinate sentences have been good for prison population reduction, nor
See Ball, supra note 144, at 968-69.
147.
148.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978) ("[A] local government may
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
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have they proven to be particularly good at reducing recidivism, promoting equity and fairness, or reducing racial disparities.
It is certainly possible that a poorly-administered, poorly-supervised
parole board could impose indefinite detention on the basis of dangerousness. Our present system already has this problem when it comes to sex
offenders (arguably worse, since the nominally "civil" nature of the incarceration means that there are no guarantees about the right to counsel and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). 149 The current system
provides very few legal checks on permanent incapacitation on civil
grounds, and pay-for-performance would do nothing to change the legal
requirements. Where it would make a difference is in imposing parsimony.
Our current system demands no proof of indefinite incapacitation in terms
of efficacy or efficiency: it is a blank check. Making the system prove that
it is doing something minimally costly and maximally effective would
make indefinite detention more difficult.

The point here is that implementation could involve a variety of
choices after the sentencing moment in court. It is one thing to have an
imprisonment policy and assume what goes on there is beneficial; it is another thing to incentivize the kind of treatment that the committing jurisdiction wants. No longer would an arbitrary, ex ante, one size fits all term
of years be the sentence, with "whatever happens, happens" as the prescription for those responsible for the prisoner. It would be much more
particular, with specific prescriptions given, not simply "get some drugs
or get some surgery in one of several hospitals," but "go to this clinic and
treat your diabetes with insulin" or "get arthroscopic surgery on your knee
from this doctor."
There is nothing intrinsic about our current system of imprisonment.
There is much that might seem speculative about the pay-for-performance
approach, but, of course, our system as it stands is huge, expensive, and a
disgrace. Mass incarceration is the experiment; trying to unwind it is not.
Historically, these proposals are much closer to the sentiments that prevailed in the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries.1 5 0 In the mid-19th century,
it was common to pick particular institutions at the time of sentencing,
these institutions were often paid per prisoner, and the institutions had particular philosophies of rehabilitation. Wardens also wanted to release prisoners on an indeterminate schedule with the idea that they could keep prisoners until they were cured. These treatments, however, were often
grounded in deeply compromised social science, whether that of Cesare

149.
See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship,
Stigma, and the Civil-CriminalDistinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 128-32, 179-80 (2011) (summarizing the procedural protections provided in civil commitment proceedings for sex offenders).
I50.
Ball, Why State Prisons?,supra note 25, at 89-93.
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Lombroso's physical indicia of the "born criminal"' 5 ' or the horrific testicular mutilations of Dr. Leo Stanley at San Quentin.1 5 2 These are real
concerns; we do not know the blind spots we have except in retrospect.
Perhaps future generations will look with horror on contemporary criminology. But even if we are blind to better treatments, we should not blind
ourselves to the idea of treatment in general. Put another way, the "nothing
works" philosophy is misnamed. It should be called "nothing works-except prison" because it implicitly assumes that prison is worth doing even
if nothing else is. Prison may arguably have something going for it in terms
of efficacy-though the magnitude and even the direction of the effects
are disputed' 53-but there is tremendous evidence that it is inefficient.
Criticisms of the rehabilitative approach, then, are much like the criticisms more generally leveled at actuarialism. I am not suggesting that evidence-based practices are immune to some of the harms attributed to
them, most notably disparate impacts on people of color, but it can hardly
be claimed that our current system does not have ruinous effects on people
of color. The causes under our current system are simply harder to discern
with any exactitude, which means everyone and no one is to blame. That,
to me, is not a virtue.154 Algorithms can be audited; policies can be improved. Intuition can be neither audited nor improved.
The current system is both overdetermined and too discretionary. It
is overdetermined in the sense that a given set of years is typically given
for an individual offense, including via mandatory minimums. It is too
discretionary in the sense that charging decisions are beyond review. The
alternative of evidence-based indeterminate sentences would keep discretion but provide some limits, and it would ensure that there is discretion
on the back end of sentencing as well.
C. Advantages of a Value Orientation
There are several potential advantages that might result from a valueoriented system.
The first is to generate some momentum towards a creation of a penological state of the art. Measuring outcomes and rewarding value creation will create incentives for their widespread implementation. Put another way, why are there no standard criminological treatments? It could
See generally MARY GIBSON, BORN TO CRIME: CESARE LOMBROSO AND THE ORIGINS OF
151.
BIOLOGICAL CRIMINALITY (2002).
See Ethan Blue, The Strange Career of Leo Stanley: Remaking Manhood and Medicine at
152.

San Quentin State Penitentiary, 1913-1951, 78 PAC. HIST. REV. 210, 211 (2009).
For a review of the evidence generally, see Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Ef153.
fectiveness of CorrectionalRehabilitation:A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sc. 297 (2007).
See Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Gender, Risk Assess154.
ment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men 27-28 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory

Research Paper No. 10, Jan. 18, 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2718460
(noting that adjustments to risk assessments can also exacerbate disparate impact).
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be that there is insufficient research or that local populations are different,
but it is also the case that demonstrably ineffective programs (such as
scared straight) have not yet been fully eradicated.' 55 Again, very little discussion in the legal academy differentiates among alternative conditions
of custody and programming in prison. The closest widespread practice on
the ground that even approximates this is probation, where judges put conditions on probationers in an attempt to cure their problems. Even then
some judges think "more is better" without using the risk-needs-responsiveness principle-which might mean more is ineffectivel 5-or going
beyond what is effective to what is efficient, given that public safety resources, like all other resources, are scarce and need to be deployed wisely.
One notable exception is pretrial practices in jurisdictions such as the federal system and New Jersey, which require judges to attach conditions of
pretrial release using the least restrictive means possible. 157
Tying funding to value creation will incentivize both innovation and
diffusion. Part of the reason that change comes so slowly to criminal justice in general and prisons in particular is that there is no incentive to
change. Prisons are not penalized for doing a bad job. Another problem is
loss avoidance-the hedonic (and economic) losses of incarceration on
society, prisoners, and their families are not counted, just the speculative
(and non-falsifiable) worry about the next sensational case of a parolee on
a crime spree. Accounting for criminal justice costs is certainly doable, as
WSIPP and others have demonstrated, and one can readily think of damages that arise simply from arrest-namely, for those who cannot make
bail, the economic losses from being in jail until the time of trial, as well
as the increased likelihood of being sentenced to a harsher penalty.' 5 1 Prisons are a major cost center in state government and, as such, should be
targeted. 5

9

If budgetary incentives are to be used, one size will not fit all. Paying
for improvements in outcome might be seen as punishing agencies and
institutions that already do things the right way, whereas paying for a certain standard of performance will be impossible for the lower-performing
agencies and institutions to meet. High-performing agencies, then, might
155.
See JusticeDepartment Discouragesthe Use of "ScaredStraight"Programs,OJJDP NEWS
AT A GLANCE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/news at glance/234084/topstory.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017) ("[A] report presented in 1997 to the U.S. Congress reviewed more than 500 crime
prevention evaluations and placed Scared Straight programs in the 'what does not work' category.
Despite these findings, Scared Straight programs continue to be used throughout the United States and
abroad.").
156.
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("The non-monetary condition or conditions of a pretrial release ordered by the court pursuant to this
paragraph shall be the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions .... ).
158.
CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER,
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be rewarded for meeting a certain standard, and lower-performing agencies might be rewarded based on annual improvements until they meet a
certain minimum standard, as low-performing hospitals currently are under Medicare's Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program.' 6 Quality
control might even need to start where medicine did, not with outcomes,
but with training, education, and professional standards. The main lesson,
though, is that quality improvement is a continual process, not a "set it and
forget it" switch.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE APPROACH

There are a number of criticisms that can be leveled at the pay-forperformance approach. I will discuss five. First, that it ignores important
issues: the dignitary interests of people in prison and the retributive interests in punishment, neither of which can be priced or quantified. Second,
that it cannot be operationalized since we do not know what works in
prison rehabilitation. Third, that the medical approach might expand the
scope of the criminal justice system (net widening). Fourth, that it might
lead to bargain basement incarceration ("tough 'n' cheap" in Hadar Aviram's phrasing 1). Fifth, that it punishes the disadvantaged for their social
deficits. Before getting into these objections, it is important to emphasize
that the pay-for-performance approach is not intended to be exclusive of
all others. Mass incarceration has a number of things wrong with it. It is
inhumane, arbitrary, and racist, to be sure. But it is also expensive and
ineffective. There is no reason not to investigate these shortcomings in
addition to or alongside others.
Non-pecuniary interests. A first criticism is that not all interests can
be addressed via the value-creation framework, whether it is the dignitary
interest of prisoners or the public's interest in retribution. Discussions
about how to deploy social resources are, in many ways, discussions about
social priorities. As a society, we are what we fund. There is no reason that
we cannot say both that prisons violate dignity and that they do so in a way
that wastes resources, including human potential. There is also no reason
we cannot say that retributive interests might be met in a system that makes
us safer in a more effective and efficient way.
Starting with the dignity point, I would query whether it promotes
human dignity to warehouse people and do nothing for them (particularly
given how little opportunity many of them had to participate meaningfully
in society) or to spend money on prisons and not on schools or other generative endeavors. Moreover, the idea that prisoners can only be warehoused forecloses any redemption. Rehabilitation humanizes the offender

160.
Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linking-quality-to-payment.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
161.
See AVIRAM, supra note 68, at 164.

490

DENVER LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 94:3

and has, as its starting point, the idea that she is worth saving and redeemable. Mercy is, after all, a part of retribution (albeit one seldom emphasized).
As for retribution, I will not belabor the criticisms of retributivism
here,1 62 but will only suggest that a value orientation is compatible with
notions of desert and redemption. It is, of course, difficult to summarize
the wide variety of retributive theories, and I will not attempt to do so here.
At its most basic, retributivism can be characterized as sounding in desert,
with punishment involving the imposition of suffering on the offender proportional to the crime she committed. 63 Pay-for-performance does not target offender suffering, but it is not incompatible with it either. For sentences involving mixed theories of retribution and rehabilitation, an outcome-orientation could simply apply to the rehabilitative part of the sentence.164 To the extent that the retributive theory is a limiting one, the parsimony imposed on punishments under the scheme dovetails nicely with
the idea that punishment should not exceed the crime. Expressive theories
of punishment, such as those espoused by Joel Feinberg' 65 and Jean Hampton,166 argue that punishment serves to express society's outrage and send
a message to the offender. To the extent we want punishnient to make
someone learn a lesson, outcomes are a superior method of demonstrating
that the lesson has, in fact, been learned. A change in behavior is superior
to a mere theory that an offender will (or must) have learned her lesson
because she went to prison; it is, instead, a way of demonstrating that she
actually learned it. These changes also provide better evidence of the
"meaning of punishment[]" than claims that are always asserted-without
proof-that the legislature, judge, or public meant the message or that it
was ever received as such by the convicted.167 Finally, theories that sound
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in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2013); see also Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O'Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass Incarceration: Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and ConsequentialistResponses to Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 503 (2015). For a criticism of how "limiting retributivism" has failed to provide any meaningful limits in an era of mass incarceration, see
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in moral failing or poor choice-making would also be consonant with treatment regimes that seek to identify and correct these failings.
Nothing works. A second criticism is perhaps the most obvious one:
that nothing works, and that there is no evidence that one approach to incarceration and sentencing has better results than another. I have assumed
that there is more than "nothing" that is promising, but I also would argue
that even if there is no good evidence about effective programming, pace
WSIPP, it could be that we have simply not yet found the evidence or
found the program, not that such a discovery is impossible. In medicine,
too, diagnoses and treatments change and improve all the time. There are,
of course, some legitimate concerns about throwing one's lot with science
when it comes to criminal law. The experience of phrenology, eugenics,
and race-based theories of criminality demonstrate the fallibility of the scientific state of the art when viewed by later generations.' 68 We have very
real evidence of the ways in which science has been used to mistreat people, particularly those who are the most powerless in society.' 69 Here
again, it will be crucial to have transparency about what is being done and
why and to include a robust system of monitoring and public comment as
we proceed.
At the same time, there is some reason to be skeptical that nothing
will be shown to work in the penological context. Is quality in prison really
harder than in medicine? Is it more difficult to research how to treat a violent person than it is to treat cancer or to improve survival rates of premature babies? Is it impossible or just not been done-or even really tried?
Even if it were true that nothing works, not all equally ineffective
programs cost the same. Some might be cheaper. Moreover, even if nothing works in terms of making people better, surely some things work at
making them worse. Solitary confinement exacerbates problems with
mental health; 170 it is also extremely expensive. 7' Even if it were true that
being housed in a general prison population did not make someone "better," it certainly does not damage someone nearly as much as solitary confinement.
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Net widening. There is a fear that a focus on rehabilitation, particularly using a medical model, could somehow expand the size and scope of
the carceral state or social control more generally.172 These fears are certainly worth addressing, given the most recent decades' explosion of penal
control. But net widening is a function of a lack of accountability: the net
can only widen in a system where criminal justice is subsidized and claims
about public safety are asserted without proof. In a system where efficacy
and efficiency must be demonstrated, and funding is tied to that demonstration, an unjustifiable widening of the net will be much more difficult,
not easier. Not every solution to a problem will be carceral-just as in
medicine, not every malady requires hospitalization (or even, as with viruses, any real medical response at all). Diagnosis does not always require
treatment, nor, certainly, does it require the most intrusive treatment. Some
criminal problems will require "inpatient" solutions, some "outpatient" solutions, and some "non-patient" solutions. The key is forcing these interventions to be justified in terms of results. Programs implemented on the
basis of fiscal responsibility have often resulted in a shrinkage of the criminal justice system-not just re-entry, but "non-entry."l 73
It is, of course, true that not everyone gets better in the criminal justice system, particularly those with mental illnesses. 174 It is the ineffectiveness and expense ofjail and prison as a response to mental illness that have
provided the impetus for non-entry, problems more easily uncovered when
there is a systematic commitment to looking at outcomes. 175
Net widening is objectionable, in part, because it is not worth the
money and does not actually work. These are the very criteria on which
172.
For a discussion of net widening in the mental health context, see Jeffrey L. Geller et al.,
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29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 551-52, 554 (2006).
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(quoting County Supervisor Cindy
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2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/5/19/new-efforts-tokeep-the-mentally-ill-out-of-jail (reporting, inter alia, that programs to keep the mentally ill out ofjail
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The same is true for homeless people who are swept up in the system. Graves, Yu: Palantir, UCSF
Partnerwith Santa Clara County on Homelessness Breakthrough, MERCURY NEWS (June 28, 2016,
9:02 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/28/graves-yu-palantir-ucsf-partner-with-santaclara-county-on-homelessness-breakthrough (reporting on a social impact bond that targeted homeless
people who used many county resources for supportive housing, saving money and improving health
outcomes). For an analysis of risk-based pretrial that results in lower costs and lowerjail populations,
see Jane Wiseman & Stephen Goldsmith, FairnessIs FiscallyResponsible, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (July
6, 2016), http://www.pretrial.org/faimess-fiscally-responsible. One could imagine that low-level drug
offenders-say, those primarily arrested for possession offenses-might be addicted and thus incurable by being jailed. This hypothetical seems eminently likely, but it is not fatal to a pay-for-performance approach. A focus on an effective and parsimonious use of resources would foreground the
idea that incarcerating this group of people incurs a loss of money, a loss of time, and significant
hardship to the "offender" while advancing no end. Any justification remaining would have to come
from retributive concerns, which again are not affected by this framework.
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programs would be penalized under pay-for-performance. In short, it is
much harder to justify net widening in terms of costs, benefits, and efficacy than it is on other theories such as retribution. The same is true for
onerous terms of probation or heavy collateral consequences. Only when
the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the net are hidden can the net get
wider.
Tough 'n' cheap. Pay-for-performance can easily handle concerns
that systems will cut costs by worsening conditions of confinement. The
key, again, is that value creation requires not just cost-savings, but improved outcomes. Cutting meal services, for example, is likely to make
prisons more dangerous,176 just as cutting rehabilitative services both undermines discipline and diminishes prospects for successful re-entry.177 In
a pay-for-performance scheme, these dangers would be foregrounded. The
external harms they would impose would be resisted by other "downstream" agents in the system-not just public-interest lawyers, but agents
of the state who would have to devote more of their resources to cleaning
up the mess. Ultimately, the value-creation approach requires that systemic resources be considered, not just local budgets. The value argument
does not replace rights-based arguments, but neither does it contradict
them. It supplements them. Appealing to economic efficiency is a way of
expanding the constituency supporting the unwinding of mass incarceration. It might even be more effective. The Eighth Amendment limit to
prison conditions leaves much to be desired in terms of speed; it was only
several years after California stipulated that it was violating the Eighth
Amendment that the Supreme Court finally forced it to address the causes
of the violation in Plata.17 8 A value focus might provide quicker feedback
and would give other actors within the system financial incentives to address problems.
Punishingthe have-nots. A final objection is that criminals with different social backgrounds will be punished disproportionately: that diagnoses that take into account social deficits will just end up punishing the
poor. If there are deficits, why work on them only in prison? With this
objection, I agree. This is why efficacy and efficiency in treatment goes
only so far and why, ultimately, the wider-ranging reorganization of criminal justice funding will have to include prevention. Criminal justice funding reform will have to encompass social welfare programs that are not
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traditionally considered public safety programs but which might, nevertheless, prevent criminal activity. Most people would surely rather pay a
few thousand dollars to subsidize poor children's day care than pay tens
of thousands to subsidize elderly prisoners' healthcare-yet our system,
through neglect and underinvestment, means those forgotten children of
yesterday become the geriatric prisoners of tomorrow. We should have a
system that incentivizes front-end investments and penalizes the misallocation of resources. We should not allocate social welfare resources only
after crime and criminals have been generated. This is the argument that
must be addressed in future research.
Still, it must be noted that our current focus on incapacitation of millions of people offers no way out. Our existing system is full of poor people and people of color-those most disadvantaged by society. At least in
a pay-for-performance system there are incentives to treat offenders, incentives for offenders themselves to get treatment, and incentives to release people when they are ready. Prison subsidies do none of that.1 79
CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to lay out a vision for where criminal justice might go. It has not been intended to be overly conclusive, nor is the
social science necessarily definitive. Instead, I have sought to introduce a
goal-oriented framework into which the latest research and best practices
might fit in a way that promotes the dissemination and adoption of those
best practices. If it does no more than complement the existing work being
done on criminal justice CBA, it will have done enough.
Throughout the Article, I have focused only on the ways in which
existing treatment could be made more effective. Healthcare economics
has also pointed out another valuable lesson: prevention is much more effective and efficient than treatment. Future research should explore the
prevention model and draw heavily on work being done in criminal justice
cost-benefit analysis by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy,
the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, and others.180 The real gains in efficacy
and efficiency will only come when we realize that crime prevention outside the criminal justice system is less intrusive and more effective than
post facto treatments. Because this approach would require, at a minimum,
greater reorganization of government to allow for greater fungibility of
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resources-including not just criminal justice, but programs such as housing, education, and income supplements-I will leave it for another time.
The ultimate goal of this project is to outline a research agenda that might
be useful for others to use as they seek to improve the administration of
criminal justice. I know I do not have all the answers; I simply hope to
have identified some of the important questions.
As I have stated in prior articles, there are many different ways to
structure and fund criminal justice systems, and many different ways have
in fact been employed in the United States, from purely local criminal justice, to unified corrections systems, and other systems in between.' 8 In
this Article, I have proposed another option for us to consider alongside
those alternatives. It is worth remembering that the system that has developed is historically contingent, not inevitable or constitutionally required.
Moving forward, it is also clear that academic and theoretical writing
are not enough to unwind the carceral state. Policymakers and practitioners will have to engage with the system at the process level, working with
those in the system to get their perspective, their detailed knowledge about
policies and processes, to get them to buy in, and maybe even to restructure
their own contracts and performance incentives.
There is a natural tendency to dismiss some or all of the preceding
analysis as utopian, though perhaps not as utopian as the quote from Samuel Butler's novel with which I began the Article. Indeed, utopianism is a
criticism leveled at Porter's work: it cannot work in real life, costing is
difficult, there is no state of the art, diagnoses are difficult, etc.182
I would certainly not claim that restructuring the criminal justice system along the lines I have suggested would be easy, but it would at least
take seriously the idea of public safety and make it more than a rhetorical
device to be invoked every time new ground is broken on an unproven,
inefficient prison construction project. In the end, there is nothing to be
lost by trying to re-imagine our present system. Making change happen is
always difficult, but making our present system better-given the very low
bar set-is certainly worth the attempt.
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